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1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the interaction between competition and regulation in telecommu-
nications markets, with the focus being on the central issue of access charges and network
interconnection.1 The main discussion is divided into three parts. In section 2 I discuss the
problem of one wayaccess pricing, which is where entrants need to purchase vital inputs
from the incumbent, but not vice versa. In this case, because of the incumbents monopoly
position in the access market the rm behaves in many ways like a text-book monopolist,
and without control it will usually set access charges too high. The desirability of regulatory
intervention is therefore clear, and the section discusses how to set access charges in a variety
of situations: when the incumbents retail is chosen in advance (and perhaps in an ad hoc
way); when the incumbents retail prices and access charges are chosen simultaneously to
maximize welfare (Ramsey pricing), and when the incumbent is free to choose its retail tari¤.
In section 4 I discuss the two wayaccess, or network interconnection, problem, which
is where all rms in the market need to purchase vital inputs namely, access to rival rms
subscribers from each other. In this situation the danger might not be so much one of
foreclosure, as in the one way case, but of collusion between networks. Can free negotiations
between networks over their mutual access charges induce high prices for subscribers? The
answer to this question is subtle, and depends in part on the kinds of tari¤s that networks
o¤er. Bridging these two sections is a discussion in section 3 of competitive bottlenecks,
The section on one way access pricing owes a great debt to joint work with John Vickers. I am also
grateful to Eric Bond, Carli Coetzee, Wouter Dessein, Michael Doane, Joshua Gans, Martin Peitz, Patrick
Rey, David Sappington, Vasiliki Skreta, Daniel Spulber, Jean Tirole, Tommaso Valletti, and Julian Wright
for several helpful comments. I am responsible for all views and remaining errors.
1Another survey on the same topic can be found in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000).
Points of similarity and contrast between the two surveys will be discussed at various places in this chapter.
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which is where networks operate in a competitive market for subscribers, and yet have a
monopoly position for providing access to these subscribers. (This model is motivated by
the mobile telephony market and the internet market.) Not surprisingly, this kind of market
exhibits features both of competitive markets (no excess prots overall) and of monopoly
markets (in the mobile sector, high prots are generated in the market for call termination,
which are then used to attract subscribers).
Before starting the analysis, however, it is worth listing a few kinds of access services.
There are numerous kinds of entry strategies a new telecommunications rm could follow
ranging from utilizing basic resale of an incumbent rms own retail service, which involves
little in the way of physical investment, to full-blown infrastructure-based entry and each
strategy requires its own kinds of access or interconnection services from incumbent rms.
A very partial list of such services includes:
 Call termination: When a customer connected to rm A calls a customer of rm B,
the former must (usually) pay the latter to deliver its call. Included within this is
international call termination, where the network of a caller in one country must pay
the relevant network in the destination country to deliver its calls (these payments
being knows as settlement ratesin this context).
 Call origination: A rm may have chosen not to construct a link directly to its cus-
tomers, and so must rely on another rm to provide this link. An obvious example is
long-distance competition, where a rm may choose to compete only on long-distance
services, and therefore needs to pay an incumbent provider of local exchange services
to originate (and terminate) its calls.
 Leasing network elements: A rm may lease some part of another rms network for
instance, the local link into a subscribers home (known as local loop unbundling)
for some specied period. At one level this is just like call termination and origination
except that the network is leased per month rather than per minute. However, con-
tracts for local loop unbundling might allow the entrant to be more exible in the
technology it uses in combination with the network element such as a di¤erent sig-
nalling technology and so in practice this may be quite di¤erent.
 Roaming on mobile networks: For mobile networks, the equivalent of call termination
and origination is roaming, which is when a subscriber moves outside the area covered
by her own network A, and still wishes to make and receive calls. In this case network
A needs to arrange for a second network with adequate coverage to pick up and deliver
the calls.
 Spectrum rights: A more esoteric accessservice is the need by mobile networks for
suitable electromagnetic spectrum, a resource which is typically managed by govern-
ment. The trend is for this essential facility to be auctioned o¤ by government.
2
2 One-way Access Pricing
Many of the issues involving access pricing are best analyzed in a one way access framework,
i.e. where the incumbent rm has a monopoly over important inputs needed by its rivals,
but it itself needs nothing from other rms. (Outside the telecommunications sector, in
markets such as gas and electricity, the one way paradigm is essentially the only one that
is needed.) We discuss one way access pricing policy in a variety of situations. However,
the analysis is entirely concerned with the case of vertical integration: the supplier of access
services also operates in the retail markets supplied (potentially) by its rivals. The case of
vertical separation is simpler, and has been analyzed elsewhere.2 In addition, the focus is
entirely on regulating access charges, and the important possibility that the incumbent will
try to disadvantage rivals using various non-price instruments is ignored.3
Before we present the main analysis, some important preliminaries are discussed: how
to achieve e¢ cient entry when the incumbents retail prices are out of line with its costs
(section 2.1), and how an unregulated vertically integrated rm will behave towards its
rivals (section 2.2). Although it is usual to treat the (regulated) access pricing problem
and the (unregulated) foreclosure problem separately, it is one of the pedagogical aims of
this chapter to show how many of the principles that underlie the policies that enable an
unregulated rm to extract maximum prot from consumers and its rivals carry over to
regulatory policies aimed at maximizing social welfare.
2.1 The E¤ect of Unbalanced Retail Tari¤s
Incumbent telecommunications rms are often forced to o¤er retail tari¤s that depart signif-
icantly from their underlying costs in several dimensions. (As we will see, the access pricing
problem would be trivial if this were not the case.) There are two broad ways in which prices
can depart from marginal costs. First, there is the problem caused by xed and common
costs: setting all prices equal to marginal cost will not allow the incumbent to break even.
This Ramsey problem which involves the calculation of the optimal departures of prices
from costs is discussed in section 2.5 below. Second, there is the problem that prices are
determined in some, perhaps ad hoc, manner and may not reect costs at all, and prots
from one market are used to subsidize losses in others.4 The focus in this section is on the
second kind of distortion.
2See for instance, section 5.2.1 in Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994) and section 2.2.5 in La¤ont and
Tirole (2000). Papers that discuss the disirability or otherwise of vertical integration include Vickers (1995),
Weisman (1995), Sibley and Weisman (1998) and Lee and Hamilton (1999). (These latter papers however
discuss unregulated downstream markets.)
3For further discussion of non-price discrimination against rivals, see section 4.5 in La¤ont and Tirole
(2000), Sibley and Weisman (1998), Economides (1998) and Mandy (2000).
4It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss why such cross-subsidies are so prevalent, or whether they
are desirable. See Chapter 6 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000) and Riordan (2002) for discussions of this, and for
further references.
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Examples of this practice in telecommunications include:
 A requirement to o¤er geographically uniform retail tari¤s even though the costs of
network provision vary across regions;
 A requirement to o¤er specic groups of subscribers subsidized tari¤s;
 A requirement that call charges be used partly to cover non-tra¢ c sensitive network
costs, and that xed charges do not cover the full costs of xed network provision;
 One-o¤ connection costs are not charged to subscribers as a one-o¤ lump-sum, but
much of the cost is collected periodically (e.g. quarterly) as xed charges;
 Making a call often involves only a call set-up cost and the call cost is independent of
duration, and yet call charges are typically levied on a per-minute or per-second basis.
Naturally such patterns of cross-subsidy lead to di¢ culties with laissez-faire entry, and there
will tend to be too muchentry into articially protable segments and too littlein the
loss-making markets. In addition there is the funding problem: if entry eliminates prots in
the previously protable markets, then the incumbent may be unable to continue to fund
its operations in loss making markets. Since they have nothing to do with the presence of
essential facilities per se, for maximum clarity I examine these issues in this section assuming
that entrants do not need access to the incumbents network to provide their services.5
In the next two sub-sections I discuss how e¢ cient entry can be ensured using two di¤erent
models for the competitive process. (These two models will be used throughout section 2
of the chapter.) Despite the apparent duplication, I use both models as they illustrate
complementary aspects of competition in the market. The rst model might be termed
the unit demands(or contestable) model, and it involves a one-for-one displacement of
services from the incumbent to the entrant when entry occurs. The crucial aspect of this
model is that, as long as prices do not exceed their gross utility, consumers have xed and
inelastic demands. This feature implies that there are no welfare losses caused by high retail
prices (provided consumers are served). As a result, we will see that the incumbent will
typically not act to distort the market, even if left unregulated, and this feature perhaps has
unrealistic welfare implications. In addition, competition is all or nothingand either the
incumbent or the entrant will serve a given subscriber group. This model is used mainly
because it provides easy illustrative examples, and provides a simple intuitive way to discuss
many of the main policy issues without getting distracted by demand elasticities, product
di¤erentiation, and so on.
The second model is termed the competitive fringemodel, and involves the same service
being o¤ered by a group of entrants, where this service is di¤erentiated from the incumbents
5Thus, this section would apply naturally to postal service. See Crew and Kleindorfer (1998) for a related
analysis.
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own o¤ering. Competition within the fringe means that prices there are driven down to cost
and the fringe makes no prot. This model is more appropriate when entry is not all-or-
nothing, so that the incumbent retains some market share even when entry occurs. Thus, this
model works quite well when discussing competition in the long-distance or international call
markets, when a large number of rms may enter the market and yet the incumbent retains
a market presence. Because demand curves are downward sloping with this model, there
are welfare losses associated with high prices, and this provides a rationale for regulatory
intervention.6
2.1.1 Unit Demand Model
Consider a specic subscriber group that is o¤ered a retail package by the incumbent, denoted
M, which may be out of line withMs costs.7 SupposeM incurs a total cost C per subscriber,
and generates gross utility U per subscriber. The price for Ms service is mandated to be P
per subscriber (this price being determined by a process outside the model). A subscribers
net utility is therefore U P . Suppose there is a potential entrant, denoted E, who can supply
a rival package that costs c per subscriber and generates gross utility of u per subscriber.8
Welfare per subscriber, as measured by the sum of consumer utility and prots, is equal to
u  c if E serves subscribers and U  C if M retains the market. Therefore, successful entry
is socially desirable if and only if
C  c+ [U   u] : (1)
Given Ms price P, the entrant can attract subscribers provided its own price p is such that
u p  U P . Therefore, entry will occur whenever the maximum price that can be charged
by E, which is p = P   [U   u], covers its costs, i.e. when
P  c+ [U   u] : (2)
6Note that neither of these models allow the entrant(s) to have any e¤ective market power, and this
assumption is maintained for most of the chapter. (In the section on two way interconnection, there are
several cases where all rms have market power.) If entrants do have market power then access charges
should be chosen with the additional aim of controlling the retail prices of entrants. This would typically
lead to access charges being set lower than otherwise, following the same procedure as the familiar Pigouvian
output subsidy to control market power. Allowing for this will make an already complex discussion more
opaque. However, see section 3.3.1 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000) for a discussion of the implications for policy
when entrants have a degree of market power.
7This discussion, as well as those in sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.1, is taken from Armstrong (2001). The
geographical example is used because it is the simplest way to make the main points. However, the same
broad principles apply to other ways of partitioning subscribers, such as into high-usage and low-usage
groups. The complication of this kind of alternative framework is that rms will most likely not be able
directly to observe the group to which subscribers belong, and so will have to screen subscribers see section
3.2.3.3 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000) for analysis along these lines.
8This utility could be higher than that supplied by M (if E uses a newer and superior technology for
instance), or it could be lower (if subscribers incur switching costs when they move to the entrant).
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Whenever P 6= C, therefore, private and social incentives for entry di¤er.
There are two kinds of market failure, depending on whether the sector is protable or
loss-making for the incumbent. Suppose rst that the market segment is required to be
protable, so that P > C. Then whenever
P  c+ [U   u]  C
entry occurs when it is socially undesirable. In this case entry can protably take place even
when the entrant has higher costs and/or lower quality than the incumbent. (In this sense
there is too muchentry.) Alternatively, if P < C then when
P  c+ [U   u]  C
it is socially desirable for entry to take place, and yet it is not privately protable. In this
case entry does not occur even though the entrant has lower costs and/or a higher quality
of service. In sum, whenever the incumbents prices are required to depart from its costs
of serving subscribers, there is a danger of undesirable entry into protable markets and of
too little e¢ cient entry into loss-making markets.
In theory it is a straightforward matter to correct this divergence between the private
and social incentives for entry. For these subscribers the incumbent is implicitly paying an
output taxof
t = P   C (3)
per subscriber which is positive or negative depending on whether the segment is protable
and e¢ cient entry is ensured provided that the entrant is also required to pay this tax.9
Notice that this tax is equal to the incumbents lost prot or opportunity cost when it
loses a subscriber to its rival.
While it may seem a little abstract to use these kinds of output taxes to correct for
allocative ine¢ ciencies in the incumbents tari¤, these can sometimes be implemented in
a simple and non-discriminatory way via a well designed social obligationsor universal
service fund of the kind sometimes proposed for the telecommunications industry. This
procedure can be illustrated by means of a simple example, summarized in Table 1 below.
(I return to variants of this example later in the chapter.)
9With this tax an entrant will nd it protable to take over a subscriber provided that
u  c  t  U   P ;
i.e. whenever u  c  U   C. Therefore, entry takes place if and only if it is desirable.
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URBAN RURAL
number of subscribers 20m 10m
Ms cost per subscriber $50 $200
Ms price per subscriber $100 $100
Ms overall prot for each type $1bn prot $1bn loss
Any rms contribution to fund $50 -$100
Table 1: Giving correct entry incentives via a universal service fund
Here, the incumbent o¤ers a retail service to two groups of subscribers, a high cost
rural group and a low cost urban group. Regulatory policy, in the form of universal service
obligations, demands that the incumbent o¤ers service to both groups at the same price,
$100, and (without entry) the rm makes a prot from urban subscribers that just covers
the loss from rural subscribers.
As discussed above, a laissez-faire entry policy will most likely lead to (i) ine¢ cient entry
into the articially protable urban market, (ii) too little e¢ cient entry into the loss-making
rural sector, and (iii) funding di¢ culties for the incumbent in the event of cream-skimming
urban entry. To counter these problems, suppose the regulator sets up a fund containing
$1bn to nance the rural sector. The source of this fund is the prots generated in the urban
sector, and either rm the entrant or the incumbent must pay an amount $50 (Ms prot
margin in this sector) into this fund for each urban subscriber they serve. In return, any
rm that serves a rural subscriber receives a subsidy from the fund equal to $100 (Ms
per-subscriber loss in that sector) for each subscriber served. By construction, provided the
number of subscribers in the two groups does not change with entry, such a fund is self-
nancing, and widespread entry does not undermine the ability of the incumbent to supply
the loss making market. More important from an economic e¢ ciency point of view, though,
is the feature that the contribution scheme ensures that in each sector the entrant has to
pay the output tax/subsidy (3) which gives it the correct entry incentives.10
2.1.2 Competitive Fringe Model
The second model of competition shows how this policy applies in a di¤erent context.11 As
discussed above, in order to introduce product di¤erentiation, and to sidestep the issue of the
market power of entrants, I assume there is a competitive fringe of price-taking entrants, still
denoted E, all of whom o¤er the same service (which is di¤erentiated from that supplied by
M ). The impact of modelling competition as a competitive fringe is that we may assume the
rivalsprice is always equal to their perceived marginal cost, and the fringe makes no prots.
10Clearly, in implementation great care must be taken to ensure that entrants cannot bypassthis output
tax, for instance by providing a similar but not identical service.
11This model of competition is adapted from La¤ont and Tirole (1994) and Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers
(1996).
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Let P and p be Ms price and Es price for the respective services. Let V (P; p) be consumer
surplus with the two prices. This satises the envelope conditions VP (P; p) =  X(P; p)
and Vp(P; p) =  x(P; p), where X and x are, respectively, the demand functions for the
incumbents and the fringes services.12 Assume that the two products are substitutes, so
thatXp  xP  0. As before, the incumbent has marginal cost C and the fringe has marginal
cost c. In order to achieve the correct amount of entry, the regulator levies a per unit output
tax t on the fringes service. Then competition implies that the fringes equilibrium price is
p = c + t. Keeping the incumbents price xed at P , the regulator aims to maximize total
surplus (including tax revenue) as given by
W = V (P; c+ t)| {z }
consumer surplus
+ tx(P; c+ t)| {z }
tax revenue
+ (P   C)X(P; c+ t)| {z }
Ms prots
: (4)
Maximizing this with respect to t implies that the optimal fringe price and output tax is
given by
p = c+ d(P   C) ; t = d(P   C) ; (5)
where
d =
Xp
 xp  0 (6)
is a measure of the substitutability of the two products: it measures how much the demand
forMs service decreases when E supplies one further unit of its own service.13 In particular,
if the market is protable, i.e. when P > C, then it is optimal to raise the rivalsprice above
cost as well, i.e. to set t > 0. The reason for this is that prots are socially valuable, and
given P > C it is optimal to stimulate demand for Ms service, something that is achieved
by driving up the rival price (given that services are substitutes).
Analogously to (3) above, t is Ms lost prot caused by the marginal unit of fringe
supply. This lost prot is the product of two terms: the marginal prot (P  C) per unit of
nal product sales by the incumbent, and d which is the change in the incumbents sales
caused by increasing fringe output by one unit. Therefore, (5) indeed gives the loss in the
incumbents prot caused by Es marginal unit of supply. With perfect substitutes we have
one-for-one displacement of rival for incumbent services, i.e. d = 1, in which case the rule
reduces to the simple formula (3). If the products are not close substitutes, so that d is
close to zero, then this optimal tax should also be close to zero, and a laissez-faire entry
policy is almost ideal. This is because policy towards the fringe market has little impact on
the welfare generated in the incumbents market, and therefore there is no incentive to set a
price in the fringe market di¤erent from cost.
12Subscripts are used to denote partial derivatives. I assume that consumers have no income e¤ects, so
that Roys identity reduces to these envelope conditions.
13Given P , if E supplies a further unit of service its price must decrease by 1=xp, which in turn causes
Ms demand to fall by Xp=xp. Note that in general d is a function of the tax t, and so expression (5) does
not give an explicit formula for the tax. However, provided the demand functions are reasonably close to
being linear so that d is close to constant this issue is not important.
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2.1.3 Discussion: The Theory of the Second-Best
The rules (3) and (5) are instances of the general theory of the second best, which states
that if one service is not o¤ered at the rst-best marginal cost price (P 6= C), then the
optimal price in a related market also departs from marginal cost (p 6= c).14 Therefore, taxes
of the form (3) or (5) are examples of what might be termed the second-best output tax.
Indeed the optimal policy in this context states that the correct departure from marginal
costs should be given by the incumbents lost prot or opportunity cost due to entry into
its market. We can sum up this discussion by the formula:
Second-best output tax required to implement e¢ cient entry
= incumbents lost prot in retail market . (7)
From an economic e¢ ciency point of view it makes little di¤erence whether the proceeds
from this tax are paid directly to M, to the government, or into an industry fund. However,
if the incumbent has historically been using the proceeds from a protable activity to nance
loss-making sectors then if the entrant pays the tax to the incumbent, the incumbent will
not face funding problems if entry takes place. However, perhaps a more transparent mech-
anism would be for a universal servicefund to be used to nance loss-making services, as
illustrated by Table 1 above. Notice that if the charge is paid to the incumbent rm then
the rm is indi¤erent to whether it retains or loses market share to a rival. This has the po-
litical benet that, with such a tax regime, the incumbent has no incentive to lobby against
entry.15 However, from an e¢ ciency point of view this is irrelevant, and it is merely a happy
feature of the regime that this tax which gives correct entry incentives also recompenses the
incumbent for its loss of market share.
2.2 The Problem of Foreclosure in an Unregulated Market
Does a vertically integrated rm with a monopoly over vital inputs have an incentive to
distort competition in related markets? The so-called foreclosure (or essential facilities)
doctrine says Yes, whereas the so-called Chicago critique claims No.16 It is not the aim of
this section to probe this general issue in any depth. Rather, I wish to demonstrate that
the main principles that govern the unregulated rms behavior toward access pricing or
14See Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).
15Or at least this is true in the short run; in the longer term the incumbent might believe that entrants
will enjoy future benets (at the incumbents expense) once they have a rm presence in the market. In
addition, the fact that the incumbents prots do not depend on the extent of entry implies that it will not
have any (short-run) incentive to foreclose entry through non-price means.
16For a discussion of the topic of market foreclosure, see Rey and Tirole (2006) and Vickers (1996). In
this paper I look at the incentive for an already vertically integrated rm to distort the downstream market,
whereas most discussions of foreclosure concentrate on the case of vertical separation and the ine¢ cien-
cies that result from this. (Vertical integration is then often a solution to the problem caused by these
ine¢ ciencies.)
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wholesale pricing as it is usually termed in the unregulated case are closely related to the
regulators incentives for choosing the access charge. In particular, the number of instruments
available to the rm/regulator a¤ects whether or not productive e¢ ciency is desirable.
Consider this simple framework: there is one vertically integrated rm M and a rival
rm (or group of rms) E which may need access to Ms upstream input to be able to
compete withM at the downstreamretail level. FirmM has constant marginal cost C1 for
providing its end-to-end retail product and C2 for providing its upstream access product to
E. FirmM chooses the per-unit charge a for its access service.17 As in section 2.1 above, we
divide the analysis into two parts, depending on the nature of the downstream competitive
interaction. In addition, we consider cases where the entrant can bypassMs upstream
input i.e. manage to supply its retail service without the use of this input from M either
by nding an alternative supplier for this service or by providing the service itself.
2.2.1 Unit Demand Model
As in section 2.1.1, suppose that Ms retail service generates gross utility of U per unit, and
that Es service (when it uses Ms access service) generates utility u. Suppose that it costs
E an additional amount c to transform a unit of Ms access service into a unit of its retail
service.
No possibilities for bypass: Suppose rst that E denitely requires Ms access service to
provide its retail service. Therefore, as in (1) above, it is socially desirable for E to enter
whenever u  [c+ C2]  U   C1, i.e. when
C1   C2  c+ [U   u] : (8)
Is it inMs selsh interest to distort the market, and to foreclose the rival even if it is e¢ cient
for the entrant to serve the market? In this special framework the answer is No. First notice,
as in (2), that if M chooses the pair of prices P and a, where the former is its retail price
and the latter is the access charge, then the entrant will choose to enter if and only if the
margin P   a satises
P   a  c+ [U   u] : (9)
(If M chooses the retail price P then to attract subscribers E must o¤er a price p such that
u  p  U   P . It will choose to enter if a price that covers its total cost c+ a satises this
condition.) If M does shut out E, for instance by setting a very high access charge a, then
its maximum prot is obtained by charging the maximum acceptable retail price, which is
P = U , and this generates prots of U   C1 per unit. On the other hand, if it allows E to
provide the retail product, for instance by setting a very high retail price P , then it can set
17More generally, M will want to choose more complicated access tari¤s, including franchise fees and so
on, to extract any available prots from E. However, in our simple models the rivals necessarily make no
prot and so there is no need to use additional instruments for this purpose.
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an access charge up to a = u  c (which just allows E to break even at its maximum possible
price p = u), which gives M a prot of u  c  C2 per unit. Therefore, by comparing these
prots with the condition for e¢ ciency in (8) we see that M will allow entry if and only if
this is e¢ cient. The incumbent manages to obtain the full surplus, and subscribers and E
are left with nothing.
Thus the rm has no incentive to distort competition downstream. Essentially this is an
instance of the Chicago critiqueof foreclosure, which in simple terms states that vertical
integration has no anti-competitive e¤ects. In this case, because of its bargaining power, the
unit-demand nature of subscriber demand and the assumption that M has full information
about the entrants technology, M can obtain Es retail service at marginal cost, and so
will use this segment whenever its own (quality adjusted) cost is higher.18 However, as is
well known, this result is non-robust in a number of ways see the next sub-section for one
example. One way in which this insight does extend, though, is to the potential for bypass
on the part of the entrant.
Bypass: Suppose next that the entrant can provide its own access service, thus bypassing
Ms network altogether.19 Suppose that when it provides its own access it incurs total costs
C^1 per unit for its end-to-end service. This new network gives subscribers a gross utility
u^. (Utility u^ may di¤er from u if using the incumbents network degrades or enhances the
entrants service compared to its stand-alone service.) Therefore, the entrant can charge a
price p = P + [u^  U ] and attract subscribers, without any need for access to Ms upstream
service. Total surplus per subscriber with this mode of entry is just u^   C^1. In sum, social
welfare per unit with the three possible entry strategies is
W =
8<: u^  C^1 with stand-alone entryu  c  C2 with entry using Ms access service
U   C1 with no entry .
(10)
Given the incumbents pricing policy (P; a), which of the three options will the entrant
follow? If it decides to use Ms access service it can charge up to p = P + [u  U ] and still
attract customers, in which case it makes a prot per unit of P + [u  U ]  [a+ c]. On the
other hand, if E bypasses Ms network it can make prot of P + [u^   U ]   C^1. Therefore,
given that E enters we deduce that it will use Ms network provided that
a  [u  u^] + [C^1   c] ; (11)
regardless of Ms retail price. (The price P a¤ects the protability of entry itself, but not
18Exactly the same e¢ ciency e¤ect is at work when a text-book monopolist faces consumers with unit
demands (with known reservation prices). The monopolist will simply charge the maximum price consumers
will pay, which causes no deadweight losses due to the shape of the demand functions.
19I ignore the possibility that the entrant should build a network and the incumbent should provide retail
services over this new network, i.e. that the entrant should provide accessto the incumbent.
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the relative protability of the two modes of entry.) Therefore the maximum prot per unit
that M can make when it succeeds in supplying access to E is [u  u^] + [C^1   c]  C2.
On the other hand, if it does not supply access to E what isMs maximum prot? Given
that E can enter at cost C^1 without the need for access, the maximum retail price that M
can charge and yet not induce stand-alone entry is P = C^1 + [U   u^], which gives it prots
of [U   u^] + [C^1  C1]. In sum, Ms maximum prot per unit under the three entry regimes
are
 =
8<:
0 with stand-alone entry
[u  u^] + [C^1   c]  C2 with entry using Ms access service
[U   u^] + [C^1   C1] with no entry .
(12)
Therefore, comparing (12) with (10) we see that the incumbents incentives are precisely in
line with overall welfare. In sum, in this model the potential for bypass does not a¤ect the
incumbents incentive to allow the most e¢ cient method of production. However, bypass
does a¤ect the prots that M can obtain: comparing (12) with (10) we see that M cannot
appropriate all the surplus in (10), and u^   C^1 of this surplus leaks out (either to E or to
subscribers, depending upon whether entry takes place or not).
In the next section, with the alternative model of competition, we will see that the
possibility of bypass does cause the incumbent to distort competition, at least when the
incumbent can use only a limited set of instruments.
2.2.2 Competitive Fringe Model
Suppose next that E is a competitive fringe as in section 2.1.2 above. Suppose that with
the access charge a the fringe has the (minimum) constant marginal cost  (a) for producing
a unit of its nal service, including the payment of a per unit of access to M . If the fringe
cannot bypass Ms access service, so that exactly one unit of access is needed for each unit
of its nal product, then  (a) = a + c, say, where c is Es cost of converting the input into
its retail product. Otherwise, though, E can substitute away from the access product, in
which case  (a) is concave in a.
Again we write P for Ms retail price and p for Es retail price, and the demand for the
two services is X(P; p) and x(P; p) respectively. Note that  0(a) is, by Shephards Lemma,
Es demand for access per unit of its retail service, and therefore the total demand for Ms
access service is  0(a)x. Suppose for now that M can somehow levy a per-unit charge t on
the output of the fringe. Since E is a competitive fringe its equilibrium retail price is equal
to total perceived marginal costs: p  t+  (a).
Putting all of this together implies thatMs total prots, , are comprised of three parts:
 = (P   C1)X(P; t+  (a))| {z }
Ms prots from retail
+ (a  C2) 0(a)x(P; t+  (a))| {z }
Ms prots from access
+ tx(P; t+  (a))| {z }
prots from output levy
: (13)
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Alternatively, since p = t+  (a) we can think of M choosing p rather than t, in which case
this prot becomes
 = (P   C1)X(P; p) + fp   (a) + (a  C2) 0(a)gx(P; p) : (14)
Clearly, whatever choice is made for the two retail prices, prot is maximized by choosing a
to maximize the term fg above, which has the rst-order condition [a   C2] 00(a) = 0. In
particular, whenever there are possibilities for the fringe to substitute away fromMs access
product, so that  00 6= 0, then a = C2 at the optimum. Therefore, marginal cost pricing of
access is the prot-maximizing strategy for a vertically-integrated rm when it can levy an
output tax on its rivals. (The two retail prices P and p are then chosen by M to maximize
its prots in (14).) In this framework, then, M has no incentive to distort rival supply in
the sense of causing productive ine¢ ciency.20
An often more realistic case is where M cannot impose an output tax on the fringe, so
that t = 0 in (13).21 In this case the rm chooses P and a to maximize its prots
 = R(P; a)| {z }
prots from retail
+ (a  C2)z(P; a)| {z }
prots from access
(15)
where R(P; a)  (P   C1)X(P;  (a)) is Ms prot in the retail sector and z(P; a) 
 0(a)x(P;  (a)) is the fringe demand for access. (Throughout the chapter, z is used to
denote the demand for access.) The solution to this problem has rst-order conditions
RP + (a  C2)zP = 0 ; (16)
Ra + z + (a  C2)za = 0 :
Notice that a = C2 cannot satisfy these conditions, and the rm will choose to set a > C2.22
Therefore, when it has only the access charge as its instrument it is optimal for M to cause
a degree of productive ine¢ ciency within the fringe in order to drive up the rival retail price.
In contrast to the simple unit demands model in section 2.2.1, the vertically integrated rm
here does have an incentive to distort the production decisions of its rivals.
20Obviously, however, since both P and p will be set too high from a welfare perspective, the retail market
is distorted in the sense of there being allocative ine¢ ciency.
21It is unreasonable to suppose that the entrant can be forced to pay the incumbent an output charge if
it chooses to supply its own stand-alone service. However, a potentially reasonable contract o¤ered by the
incumbent might take the following form: I o¤er you access at a per unit tied to your acceptance of paying
me a per-unit output charge t. For simplicity, though, we assume here that M cannot levy any form of
output charge on the fringe, perhaps because of the possible di¢ culty in observing or verifying the output
of the fringe.
22It is straightforward to show that za < 0 and, provided P > C1, that Ra > 0. Therefore, suppose that
a  C2 solves these rst-order conditions. For M to make any prots we must have P > C1 and so Ra > 0.
The second of the rst-order conditions is therefore a contradiction, and we deduce that a > C2.
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2.2.3 Discussion: Instruments and Objectives
In general the vertically integrated rm has three objectives when trying to maximize its
prots: it wishes (i) to ensure there is productive e¢ ciency, i.e. that industry costs are
minimized; (ii) to maximize total industry prot given these minimized costs, and (iii) to
extract all industry prot for itself. Consider the competitive fringe model of section 2.2.2.
First, note that (iii) is automatically satised since competition within the fringe drives
prots there to zero. When the incumbent can levy an output tax on the fringe and so has
three instruments P; a and t we have seen that the remaining two objectives (i) and (ii)
can be achieved. This is not surprising: because of product di¤erentiation, objective (ii)
requires two instruments, namely the control of the two retail prices; productive e¢ ciency is
obtained by the use of a further instrument, the access charge. By contrast, with only two
instruments for instance, if the output levy is not available then (i) and (ii) cannot both
be satised, except in the special case where bypass is not possible. (Clearly, when bypass
is impossible then (i) is automatically satised.) In general, then, a compromise is needed:
the access charge is required to control both productive e¢ ciency (which suggests that the
charge should be close to marginal cost) and the fringes retail price (a high access charge
leads to high retail prices). The optimal access charge, therefore, lies above cost and there
is a degree of productive ine¢ ciency.
The same e¤ects will be seen to be at work in the following sections on regulated markets.
The di¤erence is that the regulator, not the rm, is controlling the access and other charges,
and wishes to pursue two objectives: (i) to ensure there is productive e¢ ciency, as in the
unregulated case, and (ii) to maximize total welfare subject to these minimized costs. Again,
if the regulator has enough instruments then both of these objectives can be achieved. In
other cases, though, the access charge is required to perform too many tasks at once, and
productive e¢ ciency will most likely su¤er.23
2.3 Fixed Retail Prices With No Bypass: The ECPR
In this section and the next, we focus on the sub-problem of how best to determine access
charges for a given choice of the incumbents retail tari¤. (This retail tari¤ is assumed
to be chosen by some regulatory process outside the model.) From an economic e¢ ciency
point of view, it is clearly a superior policy to consider the incumbents retail prices and
access charges simultaneously, since that allows for the various tradeo¤s between consumer
welfare and productive e¢ ciency to be considered correctly see section 2.5 for this analysis.
However, it seems worthwhile to analyze this case of xed and perhaps ine¢ cient retail tari¤s,
since it is often the case that retail tari¤s are not set according to strict Ramsey principles
(at least as conventionally applied), and various political or historical considerations often
have an crucial impact on the choice of the retail tari¤.
23See section 3.3 in La¤ont and Tirole (2000) for a more detailed discussion along these lines.
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2.3.1 Di¤erent Representations of the ECPR
Probably the single most contentious issue in the theory and practice of access pricing is
the status of the so-called e¢ cient component pricing rule, or ECPR, which states that the
access charge should, under certain circumstances to be determined, satisfy the formula:24
access charge = cost of providing access
+ incumbents lost prot in retail markets caused by providing access . (17)
What is meant by this becomes clearer if we use the notation introduced in section 2.2. Using
the previous notation, the incumbents access charge is a, its retail price is P , its marginal
cost of supplying its downstream service is C1, and its marginal cost of providing access to
its rivals is C2. Then the expression (17) can be expressed more formally as
a = C2 + (P   C1)| {z }
Ms lost retail prot
: (18)
Here the parameter  measures how many units of Ms retail service are lost by supplying a
unit of access to its rivals.25 In fact we have already seen this rule used implicitly in section
2.1. In that section there was no vertical element present, and so there was no direct cost of
providing access, i.e. C2 = 0. In the unit demands framework, one unit of market access
enabled one unit of rival service to be supplied, which in turn displaced one-for-one a unit of
the incumbents retail service. Therefore,  = 1 in this case and the ECPR proposal reduces
to (3). Similarly, in the competitive fringe model, one unit of market access again enabled
a unit of fringe service to be supplied, but this caused only d units of incumbent service to
be given up, which then gives (5).
From this perspective, using the identity (7) we can re-write (17) to give the perhaps less
incumbent friendlyformula:
access charge = cost of providing access
+ second-best output tax on entrants . (19)
Although it is largely an issue of semantics, this way of expressing the formula better re-
ects the fact that departures from cost-based access pricing are the result of second-best
corrections to account for the incumbents distorted retail tari¤, rather than the result of
the need to compensate the incumbent for lost prot. The equivalence (19) explains why
many of the implications of the analysis in this chapter coincide with those generated from
24This rule appears to have been proposed rst in the pioneering analysis in Willig (1979) for instance,
see his expression (72). See also Baumol (1983), Baumol and Sidak (1994a), Baumol and Sidak (1994b),
Baumol, Ordover, and Willig (1997) and Sidak and Spulber (1997a) for further discussions concerning the
desirability of this rule.
25The parameter  was termed the displacement ratio by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996).
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the very di¤erent approach of Sidak and Spulber (1997a). I discuss policy from the point of
view of static economic e¢ ciency, whereas Sidak and Spulber emphasize more the need to
compensate the incumbent adequately for past investments when its network is opened up
to rivals.26
Another formula that often goes under the name of the ECPR, but what is perhaps better
termed the margin rule, states that
access charge = incumbents retail price
 incumbents cost in the retail activity . (20)
Re-arranging, this rule states that the marginavailable to the rivals, i.e. the incumbents
retail price minus its access charge, is equal to the incumbents cost in the competitive
activity. Using the above notation, if C2 is Ms marginal cost of supplying access to itself
(as well as to its rivals), then [C1   C2] is Ms marginal cost in the competitive activity.
Therefore, this rule is more formally expressed as
a = C2 + [P   C1] : (21)
Clearly this formula coincides with (18) in the case where one unit of access supplied to the
rivals causes a unit reduction in the demand for the incumbents retail service, i.e. when
 = 1. Although it is again merely a question of semantics which of the rules (17) or (20)
is termed the ECPR, it is very important when it comes to discussing the applicability of
the ECPR to distinguish between these two rules. Since we will see that the former is much
more generally valid, we will use the term ECPRfor that rule, and the term margin rule
for the latter.27
We have already seen in section 2.2 that the level of the optimal access charge is going
to depend crucially upon whether the regulator can impose an output tax on entrants. We
will see that, suitably interpreted, the ECPR as expressed in (17) or (19) is the correct rule
when additional instruments, such as output taxes on entrants, are not employed. When
output taxes are used, however, then the ECPR is not appropriate, and pricing access at
cost is the better policy (just as in the unregulated case in section 2.2).
26However, this focus on avoiding deregulatory takings could itself be viewed as promoting dynamic
e¢ ciency see pages 214216 in Sidak and Spulber (1997a).
27The discussion in section 3.2.5 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000) is confusing from this perspective in that
the margin rule and the ECPR are taken to be the same. For instance, the justication the margin rule
on page 119 is given as (using the notation of this paper): suppose that an entrant diverts one minute
of long-distance phone call from the incumbent. This stealing of business costs the incumbent an amount
equal to the markup on his long-distance o¤ering, P  C1, plus the marginal cost of giving access, C2, to the
entrant. This discussion assumes, though, that to steal one unit of business from the incumbent requires
the rival to supply exactly one further unit of its own supply, whereas in general with imperfect substitutes
the rival will need to supply more or less than the incumbents lost demand.
A nal point is that in symmetric situations with product di¤erentiation, the Ramsey optimum involves
the margin rule (but never the ECPR in our terminology) being satised see section 2.5.1 below.
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2.3.2 Unit Demands and the Margin Rule
Consider rst the simple unit demands framework of section 2.2.1 above. The incumbent
has constant marginal cost C1 for its retail service and constant marginal cost C2 for its
access service. Its retail service generates gross utility U to each of its subscribers, and it is
required by regulation to charge the retail price P (this price being determined by a process
outside the model). As assumed throughout this section, bypass of the incumbents network
by rivals is not possible, and so (by a suitable choice of units) the entrant needs precisely
one unit of access for each unit of its retail service.
There will be entry with the access charge a provided condition (9) holds. Total welfare
is higher if the entrant supplies the market if and only if condition (8) holds. Therefore,
entry incentives coincide with overall social welfare provided the access charge is determined
by the margin rule(21). As explained above, this formula is the natural interpretation of
the ECPR formula in (17) and (19) in this special context. Note that in this scenario where
there is no possibility for the entrant to substitute away fromMs access service, there is no
productive ine¢ ciency caused by setting the access charge above cost, and hence there is no
need for additional instruments such as output taxes to achieve the correct outcome.
It is also worth noting that in this model there is actually no need, from an e¢ ciency
point of view, to control the incumbents access charge (provided the incumbent knows the
potential entrants cost c and service quality u). For if M can choose its own access charge,
for xed P , it will choose to allow entry if and only if the maximum prots from selling
access to the entrant are higher than the prots obtained when it sells the retail product
itself. But the maximum prots available from selling access are obtained by setting a to
be the highest value that satises (9), which gives it prots of P   [c + C2]   [U   u] per
unit. Comparing this with the prot obtained by preventing access, which is just P   C1,
we see that the incumbent will allow entry to occur if and only if (8) holds, i.e. if entry is
more e¢ cient. Note that the level of its regulated retail price does not bias the incumbent
at all in its dealings with its rival since P a¤ects its prots from selling access and from
foreclosing entry in exactly the same way. However, it is important for this result that M
knows all relevant information about Es service, something that it unlikely to be the case in
practice (since entry has not taken place at the time the incumbent has to choose its access
charging policy). The advantage of the rule (21) is that it ensures e¢ cient entry for all kinds
of entrant, and does not require that the parameters c and u be known.
Finally, we can illustrate this margin rule in a simple extension of the example used in
Table 1.28 Again, there are two groups of subscribers, rural and urban, and the relevant
data is summarized in Table 2. Here there are two components to providing a nal service:
the network element and the retail element. The incumbent is assumed to incur the same
retail cost for each subscriber group, but its network cost di¤ers across the two groups. (The
incumbents total end-to-end cost for providing service, denoted C1 in the preceding analysis,
is therefore the sum of these two terms.) Here the entrant cannot build its own network
28Baumol (1999) provides a similar argument to that in the following discussion.
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and can compete only in the retail segment. As in section 2.1.1, the incumbent is forced by
policy to charge the same amount to both groups, despite the underlying cost di¤erences.
URBAN RURAL
number of subscribers 20m 10m
Ms cost per subscriber, of which $50 $200
retail cost is $20 $20
network cost is $30 $180
Ms retail price for service $100 $100
Ms network access charge $80 $80
Table 2: The optimality of the margin rule with no bypass
The margin rule (21) implies that the correct network access charge is $80 per subscriber,
regardless of the type of subscriber.29 This access charge implies that entry will be protable
only if the entrant has retail costs lower than the incumbents (or provides a superior ser-
vice). This policy contrasts with a cost-basedaccess charging policy, which would require
charging for urban access at $30 and charging for rural access at $180, a policy that leads
to precisely the same problems as indicated in section 2.1.1. For instance, with a network
access charge of $30 for urban services, an entrant could have a retail cost of as high as $70
(as compared to the incumbents retail cost of $20) and still nd entry protable.
2.3.3 Competitive Fringe Model
Next, consider the model of the industry as described in section 2.2.2 above, simplied so that
there is no possibility of bypass. By making a suitable choice of units, we can assume that the
fringe needs exactly one unit of access for each unit of nal product it supplies. Therefore,
the perceived marginal cost of the fringe is a+c, where c is Es cost of converting access into
its retail product, and so competition within the fringe implies that Es equilibrium retail
price is also a+ c. As in (4) above, welfare with the access charge a is
W = V (P; c+ a)| {z }
consumer surplus
+ (a  C2)x(P; c+ a)| {z }
Ms prots from access
+ (P   C1)X(P; c+ a)| {z }
Ms prots from retail
: (22)
As in (5), maximizing this with respect to a gives the following expression for the optimal
access charge:
a = C2 + d(P   C1) ; (23)
29The fact that both the retail charge and the retail cost are uniform in this example implies that the
margin rule access charge will also be uniform. In fact the access charge, $80 applied uniformly, is just the
geographically averaged network cost in this example, a feature that follows from the assumption that the
incumbent is regulated to make zero prots overall.
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where d is given in (6) above. (By inspection, the regulators problems in (4) and (22) are
identical, where the taxt in the former expression represents the markup a  C2 and the
tax revenue in the former plays the same role as the incumbents prots from access in the
latter.) Clearly this is the appropriate version of (17), and so the ECPR is again the correct
rule in this framework. Following the discussion in section 2.3.1 above, however, we see that
the margin rule (20) (21) is not valid in this framework.
In the special case where the two retail services are approximately independent in terms of
consumer demand, so that d  0, there is no opportunity cost to the incumbent in providing
access. In particular, the ECPR rule (23) states that the access charge should then involve no
mark-up over the cost of providing access. In the telecommunications context, this situation
may be relevant for determining the access charges for the use of the incumbents network
for such services as mobile and many value-added services, the provision of which might be
expected not to reduce demand for xed-link voice telephony services signicantly.
2.3.4 Discussion
This section has analyzed the case where the incumbents retail tari¤ is xed and where
rivals must have a unit of access in order to provide a unit of their retail service. We showed
that the optimal access charge in this situation is given by the sum of the cost of access
and a correction factor. From (7) this correction factor can be interpreted in two ways:
it is the incumbents lost prot in the retail sector caused by suppling access to its rivals
as in (17), or it is the second-best output tax to correct for the fact that the incumbents
retail tari¤ does not reect its costs as in (19). It is perhaps unfortunate that the former
representation is more often used, as it gives entrants the excuse to complain that the ECPR
acts to maintain monopoly prots. (However, this complaint has much greater validity
when the incumbents retail price is not regulated see section 2.6 below.) This view of the
ECPR is extremely misleading. First, the analysis here is concerned with xed retail tari¤s,
and if there is any monopoly protpresent then this is the fault of regulation and not of
the incumbent. Second, within the framework of this chapter the aim of the formula is not
to recompense the incumbent for lost prot, but rather to give entrants the correct entry
signals. For instance, if this opportunity cost element of the access charge were put into
general public funds rather than paid to the incumbent, the e¢ ciency aspects of the ECPR
would be undiminished. (However, see footnote 27 above.)
Notice that an alternative way to implement the optimum would be to charge for access
at the actual cost C2 and at the same time to levy a second best tax on the output of rivals
as proposed in section 2.1. However, in the present case where exactly one unit of access is
needed to produce one unit of output, this output tax might just as well be levied on the
input. When this xed relationship between inputs and outputs ceases to hold, however,
this convenient procedure cannot be applied. The next section discusses policy in this often
more relevant situation.
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2.4 Fixed Retail Prices and Bypass
Here we extend the previous analysis to allow for the possibility that entrants can substitute
away from the network service o¤ered by the incumbent, so that the demand for access
(per unit of nal output by the entrants) is a decreasing function of the access charge. We
perform the analysis in two stages: rst we examine the situation where the regulator has
su¢ cient instruments to obtain the desired outcome; and secondly we discuss the choice of
access charge given that this charge is the sole instrument of policy.
2.4.1 The Need to Price Access at Cost with Enough Instruments
In this section we assume that the regulator has enough instruments to implement the
desirable outcome see the discussion in section 2.2.3.30 In particular, since the relationship
between the entrants inputs and outputs is not xed, we suppose that the regulator can
control both the price of access and the entrants retail price. For instance, suppose that
the regulator can levy an output tax on the entrants. (See the next section for an analysis
of the case where only the former instrument is available.) We will concentrate on the unit
demands framework as the competitive fringe model is so similar.
Unit demand model : Here we follow the bypass model outlined in section 2.2.1, assuming that
the incumbents retail price P is xed by regulation. We wish to nd a regulatory regime that
ensures that the maximum value of welfare in (10) above is achieved. Specically, suppose
that E must pay the tax t per unit of its nal output and the charge a per unit of Ms
network services. Following the earlier argument, given that E enters the market in some
way, it will choose to use Ms network if (11) holds. On the other hand, given that E enters
in some way, (10) implies that welfare is higher when E uses Ms network if
C2  [u  u^] + [C^1   c] :
Therefore, given that entry occurs, private and social incentives for using Ms network are
brought into line by choosing a = C2. Making the network access charge equal to the cost
of providing access gives the entrant the correct make-or-buy incentives for its network
provision.31
30See also section 8 of La¤ont and Tirole (1994) for related analysis. Section 3.2.4 of La¤ont and Tirole
(2000) discusses the benets of levying output charges on entrants and notes that their use would imply
that cost-based access charges are optimal. They regard these kinds of output charges as being politically
unlikely, however. They go on to suggest that these taxes could be repackaged as a tax on the whole
industry to make them seem less discriminatory. This suggestion is illustrated in Table 3 in the current
chapter.
31Several writers loyal to the ECPR approach have suggested that the ECPR is necessary for productive
e¢ ciency see Baumol, Ordover, and Willig (1997) for instance. When bypass is possible, however, it is
usually necessary to price access at cost, rather than at the ECPR level, to ensure productive e¢ ciency at
the network level.
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Turning to the choice for t, following the analysis in section 2.1.1 the ideal output tax is
given by t = P  C1 per unit as in (3) above. With these choices for a and t we see that Es
prots per unit with its three options for entry are:
Es prot =
8<: [u^  U ] + [C1   C^1] with stand-alone entry[u  U ] + [C1   c  C2] with entry via Ms network
0 with no entry .
Just as was the case with Ms prots in (12), comparing these prots with (10) we see that
Es incentives are now precisely in line with welfare: the entrant will enter when it is optimal
to do so, and will choose to use Ms network when that is the more e¢ cient mode of entry.
Pricing access at cost means that the entrant has the correct make-or-buy incentives for
network construction conditional upon entry, and the output tax (3) means that they have
the correct incentives to enter (in any way) given that Ms retail tari¤ is distorted. Other
policies will cause various kinds of ine¢ ciencies. For instance, if the entrant is permitted to
use the incumbents network at cost C2 then it will face the correct make-or-buy incentives
conditional on entry, but not the correct incentives to enter. Alternatively, if the ECPR
charge (21) were imposed then the rival might build its own infrastructure even if it were
more e¢ cient for it to use the incumbents.
As in section 2.1.1, the output tax element of this optimal policy can often be implemented
by means of a suitably designed universal service fund, as described in Table 3.
URBAN RURAL
number of subscribers 20m 10m
Ms cost per subscriber, of which $50 $200
retail cost is $20 $20
network cost is $30 $180
Ms retail price for service $100 $100
Ms prot for each type $1bn prot $1bn loss
Any rms contribution to fund $50 $100
Ms network access charge $30 $180
Table 3: Giving correct entry and make-or-buy incentives
In this example there is a universal service fund that operates just as in Table 1: any
rm providing service to an urban subscriber must contribute $50 to this fund, and any rm
o¤ering service to a rural subscriber can receive $100 from the fund. In addition to these
contributions, the entrant can gain access to the incumbents network at actual cost (not
averaged costs as in Table 2). Notice that if the entrant chooses to enter via the incumbents
network its total payment is $80 per subscriber, just as in Table 2. However, the advantage
of splitting the ECPRcharge into two parts a cost-based access charge together with an
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output tax is that when network bypass is a possibility it is undesirable to make network
access charges deviate from the incumbents network costs.
Competitive fringe model : We discuss this briey as it so similar to the unit demands case.
Working with the model presented in section 2.2.2 above, suppose that the regulator xed
the access charge at a and the per-unit output tax on the fringe at t. Then, similarly to
expression (13) above, total welfare in this case is
W = V (P; t+  (a))| {z }
consumer surplus
+ (P   C1)X(P; t+  (a))| {z }
Ms prots from retail
+ (a  C2) 0(a)x(P; t+  (a))| {z }
Ms prots from access
+ tx(P; t+  (a))| {z }
tax revenue from output tax
(24)
or writing p = t+  (a) this simplies to
W = V (P; p) + (P   C1)X(P; p) + fp   (a) + (a  C2) 0(a)gx(P; p) : (25)
Although this di¤ers from the unregulated case in (14) by the addition of the consumer
surplus term V , this extra factor does not a¤ect the choice of a, which again is chosen
to maximize the same term fg and which again leads to marginal cost pricing of access:
a = C2. Finally, maximizing (25) with respect to p = t +  (a) yields the formula (5) for
t. Therefore, we see again that, when the regulator can use both these instruments, access
should be priced at cost, and the entrantsoutput tax should be the second-best output
tax.
Thus we have obtained one of our main points in the chapter: just as in the unregulated
case discussed in section 2.2 above, provided there are enough policy instruments available
to pursue all the objectives, there is no need to sacrice productive e¢ ciency even when
the incumbents retail is not cost-reective. Retail instruments perhaps in the form of a
carefully-designed universal service fund should be used to combat retail-level distortions
such as mandated tari¤s that involve cross-subsidies. Wholesale instruments should then be
used to combat potential productive ine¢ ciencies in this case the productive ine¢ ciency
caused by pricing access other than at cost.32
32This policy suggestion is somewhat related to the M-ECPRproposal as outlined in chapter 9 in Sidak
and Spulber (1997a). Those authors suggest that the entrant should be charged an amount up to its own
cost of providing network services for the use of the incumbents network, and a competitively neutral end-
user charge should be imposed to prevent cream-skimming entry. (See also Doane, Sibley, and Williams
(1999) for further analysis.) One advantage, however, of basing access charges on the incumbents cost is
that it decentralizes the decision about the desirability of entry to the (perhaps better informed) entrant,
and knowledge of the entrants technology is not required.
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2.4.2 Access Charges as the Sole Instrument: the ECPR Revisited
Although one of the main aims of this chapter is to argue that regulators should use output
taxes for entrants perhaps in the guise of a universal service fund to correct for distortions
in the incumbents retail tari¤, and use cost-based access charges to give the correct make-
or-buy investment decisions, the former instrument is still only rarely used. Therefore, in
this section we consider policy when the access charge is the sole instrument available to
the regulator.33 For simplicity, we discuss this issue in the context of the competitive fringe
model of section 2.2.2 above.
In this case we impose t = 0 in (24), which yields welfare with the access charge a as
W = V (P;  (a))| {z }
consumer surplus
+ (P   C1)X(P;  (a))| {z }
Ms prots from retail
+ (a  C2) 0(a)x(P;  (a))| {z }
Ms prots from access
: (26)
Maximizing this with respect to a gives
a = C2 + (P   C1) (27)
where
 =
Xp 
0(a)
 za (28)
and z(P; a)   0(a)x(P;  (a)) is the fringe demand for access. This formula is again an
instance of the ECPR formula (17), suitably interpreted. The rst term of the right-hand
side in (27) is the direct cost of providing access. The second term is the lost prot to the
incumbent in the retail sector caused by providing the marginal unit of access to fringe. This
lost prot is itself the product of two terms: Ms marginal prot (P   C1) per unit of nal
product sales, and the displacement ratio,  =  Xp 0(a)=za > 0. The parameter  gives the
reduction in demand for the incumbents retail service caused by providing the fringe with
the marginal unit of access (for a xed retail price P ).34 Therefore, the second term in (27)
indeed gives the loss in the incumbents retail prot caused by supplying the marginal unit
of access to the fringe.
This formula reduces to no-bypass rule (23) when z  x, for in that case  = d. More
generally, it is useful to decompose the displacement ratio  into two terms as
 = d=s ;
where d =  Xpxp as in (6) above, and
s =
za
xp 
0(a)
=
 00(a)x+ ( 0(a))2xp
xp 
0(a)
=  0(a) +
  00(a) (a)
 0(a)
1
E
; (29)
33This section is based on section III of Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996).
34For one more unit of access to be demanded by the fringe, the access charge has to fall by 1=za, and this
causes the demand for the incumbents retail service to fall by Xp 
0=za.
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where E =  pxp=x > 0 is the own-price demand elasticity for fringe output. The term
d represents the e¤ect of demand-side substitution possibilities, whereas s represents the
supply-side substitution possibilities. When there are no supply-side substitution possibili-
ties, so that  (a) = a + c, then s  1 and the displacement ratio is simply  = d. On
the other hand, if the fringe output and the incumbents output are perfect substitutes then
d = 1 and the displacement ratio is just  = 1=s.
Expression (29) shows that we may decompose s itself into two terms: the rst term
 0(a) captures the e¤ect of changing a on the demand for Ms access service caused by the
change in fringe output (keeping the input mix constant), while the second term captures the
e¤ect of changing a on the demand for Ms access service caused by changing the input mix
(keeping fringe output constant). The term  0(a) gives how many units ofMs access service
is needed for each unit of fringe output. The ability to substitute away from the incumbents
access service is captured by   00 = 0 in the above. Since this term is necessarily positive
we immediately obtain the basic insight that the ability to substitute away from Ms access
service causes the displacement ratio to be reduced compared to the no-bypass benchmark
(i.e. when  00  0).
Notice that if rival services do substitute for the incumbents retail service (d 6= 0) then
the ECPR rule in (27) implies that the access charge is not equal to the cost of access,
which in turn implies that there is productive ine¢ ciency whenever there is some scope
for substitution ( 00(a) 6= 0). The reason for this is that the access charge here is forced to
perform two functions, and the regulator must compromise between productive and allocative
e¢ ciency. This problem is therefore analogous to that in the unregulated case covered in
section 2.2.2.
2.5 Ramsey Pricing
Although the previous sections discussed the important problem of how to use access charges
to maximize welfare for a given pattern of retail prices imposed on the incumbent, this
approach leaves unexamined how these retail prices are chosen in the rst place. Therefore,
in this section we discuss the problem of optimally choosing the incumbents retail and
access prices simultaneously: the Ramsey pricing approach. For simplicity we discuss
this problem only in the context of the competitive fringe model. As usual, the form of the
solution will depend on whether or not bypass is an option, and, if it is, on the range of
policy instruments available to the regulator.
2.5.1 No Bypass
Here we extend the model in section 2.3.3.35 The problem is to maximize total welfare in
35This section is based on La¤ont and Tirole (1994) and Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996). See also
section 3.2 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000).
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(22) subject to the incumbent rm not running at a loss, i.e. that the variable prots the
nal two terms in (22) cover the xed costs of the rm. Letting   0 be the Lagrange
multiplier associated with this constraint, we see that the retail price P and the access charge
a are jointly chosen to maximize the following modication of (22):
W = V (P; c+ a) + (1 + ) f(a  C2)x(P; c+ a) + (P   C1)X(P; c+ a)g :
Thus, there is now a greater weight placed on the incumbents prot compared to the usual
case, in order to reect the need for charges to cover xed costs. Writing  = =(1+ )  0,
the respective rst-order conditions for P and a are
P = C1 +
xP
 XP (a  C2) +
P
M
(30)
where M =  PXPX > 0 is Ms own price demand elasticity, and
a = C2 + d(P   C1)| {z }
ECPR access charge
+
p
E|{z}
Ramsey markup
(31)
where E is Es own price demand elasticity and d is as in (6). Since the rst two terms on
the right-hand side of (31) replicate the corresponding ECPR formula in (23), this formula
states that the optimal access charge is the ECPR level, which applies if P were exogenously
xed, plus a Ramsey markup. This Ramsey markup reects the benets in terms of a
reduction in P caused by increasing the revenue generated by selling access to the fringe.
In particular, the Ramsey access charge is above the ECPR recommendation (which applies
taking as given the retail price P ). The reason for this is that a higher a raises more revenue
that can be used partly to cover the xed costs, and this allows P to be lowered (which is
good for welfare).36
It is useful to compare these expressions with the alternative expressions (13) and (18)
in La¤ont and Tirole (1994), which state (using this chapters notation) that
P = C1 +
P
^M
; a = C2 +
p
^E
where ^M and ^E are the superelasticities of the respective products.
37 Although these
two pairs of equations look very di¤erent, it is possible to show that the expressions (30)
36Section 8 of La¤ont and Tirole (1996) and section 4.7 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000) make the important
policy point that Ramsey prices can be implemented by means of a global price cap, where both the access
and retail services of the incumbent are controlled by means of a suitably designed average price cap. As
well as treating wholesale and retail services more symmetrically, they argue that this regulatory mechanism
gives the incumbent fewer incentives to exclude rivals by non-price means (compared to, say, cost-based
access charges).
37The reason that the two pairs of rst-order conditions look di¤erent is that this chapters are obtained
by maximizing over prices, whereas La¤ont and Tirole maximize over quantities.
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and (31) are indeed equivalent to those of La¤ont and Tirole. In particular, La¤ont and
Tiroles expression for the optimal access charge which expresses a as a markup over the
cost of providing access involving the superelasticity, may be re-expressed as we have done
in (31), where a is expressed as a markup over the ECPR level involving just the normal
elasticity see section 3.2.2 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000) for a similar analysis.
An important issue is the relationship between the Ramsey approach to access pricing
and the ECPR approach. Obviously, this question hinges on what we mean by the term
ECPR see section 2.3.1 for various interpretations of this rule. Using our preferred
interpretation, which is (23), we see that Ramsey pricing never leads to an ECPR access
charge. If, however, one takes the margin rule (21) as the appropriate benchmark then
it is indeed possible for the Ramsey access charge to happen to coincide with this margin
rule. This issue is discussed in section 3.2.5 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000), who show that
with enough symmetry between the incumbent and the fringe the Ramsey access charge does
satisfy (21), where P is endogenously determined by the Ramsey problem. However, it is
not clear why the margin rule should be a relevant benchmark in this context: with product
di¤erentiation the correct opportunity cost incurred by the incumbent in providing a unit of
access service is given by (23) and not by (21).
2.5.2 Bypass
Here we extend the Ramsey analysis to allow for bypass by entrants, as in section 2.2.2.
Suppose rst that the fringe pays a per-unit output tax equal to t (as well as the per-unit
charge a for access input). As usual, the price of the fringe product is equal to the perceived
marginal cost, so that p = t+  (a), and fringe prots are zero.
As in 2.2.2 and 2.4.1 above, the regulator can be considered to choose p directly rather
than t, in which case the incumbents prot  is (14). Let   0 be the shadow price on the
prot constraint   F , where F is the xed cost that needs to be covered by prots. Then
the problem is to choose P; p and a to maximize W = V (P; p) + (1 + ): However, since
for given retail prices P and p the access charge a does not a¤ect consumer surplus, it is
clear that a must be chosen to maximize  for given retail prices, so that a again maximizes
the term fg in (14). As before, provided there are some possibilities for substituting away
from the incumbents access product, the rst-order condition for this cost minimization is
a = C2 and so pricing access at cost is optimal.38 This is just an instance of the deep result
38This paragraph provides one argument, to do with distortions at the input level, for the use of both
retail and wholesale instruments for policy. Another rationale for this might be the following: Ramsey
principles imply that di¤erent retail services that use the same access service should typically have di¤erent
retail prices, depending on the demand elasticities. When there is no scope for bypass, in some cases one
could implement this outcome by di¤erential, use-dependent access charges. In others, though, this may
not be possible, perhaps because the incumbent cannot accurately monitor the use to which its network is
put. In such circumstances di¤erential retail taxes could be used to implement the Ramsey solution, and
non-discriminatory cost-based charges could then be used for network access.
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that productive e¢ ciency is desirable when there are enough tax instruments see Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971).39
Next, as in section 2.4.2, suppose the regulator has a more limited set of policy instru-
ments, and that the output tax t is not available. In this case p   (a) and the access charge
must perform two functions: it must attempt to maintain productive e¢ ciency (as before)
but in addition it must inuence the fringe retail price in a desirable way. The incumbents
prot is now as in (15). Writing  = =(1 + )  0, the respective rst-order conditions for
maximizing V + (1 + ) for P and a are respectively
P = C1 + (a  C2) zP XP +
P
I
and
a = C2 + (P   C1)| {z }
ECPR access charge
+
a
z|{z}
Ramsey markup
; (32)
where  is as given in (28), and z =  azaz is the own price elasticity of the demand for
access. In particular, the Ramsey access charge is again above the associated ECPR recom-
mendation, which this time is given by (27). These rst-order conditions imply that P > C1
and a > C2; and so access is priced above marginal cost. This in turn leads to a degree of
productive ine¢ ciency. Just as in sections 2.2.3 and 2.4.2 the access charge is called upon
to perform too many tasks, and a compromise must be made. In the next section the ac-
cess charge is forced to perform yet another task, which is to try to control the incumbents
unregulated retail price.
2.6 Unregulated Retail Prices
In this section we discuss how best to price access when this is the only instrument for
regulatory control of the incumbent.40 In particular, the incumbent is now assumed to be
free to set its retail price. For simplicity we suppose that there is no output tax on the
fringe. (It would seem strange to consider a situation where the entrants were regulated in
some sense while the incumbent was not.)
39On pages 37071 of Sidak and Spulber (1997a) those authors try to argue that pricing access di¤erently
from cost as with ECPR-style access charges does not violate the Diamond-Mirrlees result.
40This is adapted from section 7 of La¤ont and Tirole (1994), section 5.2.2 of Armstrong, Cowan, and
Vickers (1994) and Armstrong and Vickers (1998). For other analyses of access pricing with an unregulated
downstream sector, see Lewis and Sappington (1999), Economides and White (1995), Lapuerta and Tye
(1999) and Vickers (1995). In addition, sections 3 and 4 of this chapter consider other situations where rms
are unregulated at the retail level.
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2.6.1 Perfect Retail Competition
To discuss this topic in its simplest and starkest form, we rst model downstream competition
as being perfect. Specically, there is a group of rivals which o¤ers a service which is a perfect
substitute for the incumbents. Consumer demand for this homogeneous service is denoted
Q(P ), where P is the price o¤ered by rms in the market. For simplicity suppose the rivals
cannot bypass the incumbents access service, and it costs rivals c to convert a unit of access
into a unit of retail product.41 As usual, the incumbent has marginal cost C1 for supplying
its end-to-end retail service and cost C2 for providing access to the fringe. Therefore, it is
e¢ cient for the fringe to supply the market whenever
c+ C2  C1 : (33)
Control of the access charge: Suppose regulation xes the access charge at a. Then there
will be entry ifM chooses its retail price above a+c. In this caseM will get prot a C2 per
unit from providing access to the rivals. On the other hand, if M wishes to stay in the retail
market the maximum retail price it can charge is the limit price P = a+ c, which generates
prot a + c   C1 per unit. Therefore, the incumbent will choose to allow entry if and only
if this is e¢ cient as in (33). (The level of the regulated access charge does not a¤ect the
relative protability of the two strategies, although it will a¤ect the absolute protability of
either.) We deduce that, when the incumbent is free to set its retail price, it will allow entry
if and only if the entrant has lower costs, regardless of the level of the access charge. In
particular, because of opportunity cost considerations, the fact that a di¤ers from C2 does
not distort at all the incumbents incentives to compete on a level playing eldwith its
downstream rivals.
Since we have seen that productive e¢ ciency is automatically ensured in this perfect
competition setting, the access charge should be chosen to attain allocative e¢ ciency. Notice
that, regardless of whether entry is successful, the equilibrium retail price given a is P = a+c
(at least if this is below the unregulated monopoly retail price). Therefore, we wish to choose
a so that this price equals (minimized) marginal cost, so that a + c = minfC1; C2 + cg.
In the case where entry is more e¢ cient this implies that a = C2 and access is priced at
marginal cost. In the case where the incumbent should serve the market, we should ideally set
a = C1   c.42 However, when the market is fairly symmetric, in the sense that C1  C2 + c,
pricing access at marginal cost will be a good approximation to the ideal access pricing
regime.43
41Little would change if we allowed for the possibility of bypass, since this would just strengthen the motive
to choose an access charge close to cost.
42By construction, this access charge is below the cost of providing access, C2, in order to eliminate the
mark-up that the more e¢ cient incumbent would otherwise be able to charge in this market.
43This is essentially a formalization of the argument in section 7 of Lapuerta and Tye (1999), who argue
that access should be priced at cost because competition in the retail sector can be relied upon to eliminate
all distortions in that segment.
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Control of the margin: Next, consider the e¤ects of controlling the margin P   a rather
than the access charge a, so that M can choose any pair of prices P and a that satisfy
P   a = m, say. Clearly, entry takes place if and only if this regulated margin covers the
fringes retail cost, i.e. if m  c. In particular, with this regime M has no discretion about
whether or not entry takes place. If entry does take place then, given the access charge a,
the fringe retail price will be p = a+ c, and Ms prot will be (a C2)Q(a+ c). If we think
of M as choosing the fringe retail price p = a + c rather than a, then p will be chosen to
maximize (p  c C2)Q(p). On the other hand, if m < c then M will choose its retail price
P to maximize its prots (P  C1)Q(P ). In either case we have the outcome corresponding
to unregulated monopoly with entry the marginal cost is c + C2 and with the incumbent
serving the retail market the marginal cost is C1 and this kind of regulation exerts no
downward pressure on retail prices whatsoever.44 However, since welfare with unregulated
monopoly increases when the marginal cost is reduced, given that margin regulation is being
used, it is better to have entry if and only if it is e¢ cient. Therefore, we want m to be chosen
so that c  m if and only if c+ C2  C1. In other words, optimal margin regulation entails
m = C1   C2, i.e. that the margin rule (21) should be applied.
However, it is simple to verify that this is exactly the outcome whenM is totally unregu-
lated. (In section 2.2.1 we saw in a similar model that the unregulated incumbent will always
allow entry when this is e¢ cient, and will then maximize prots.) Thus we see that the best
form of margin regulation which is given by the margin rule version of the ECPR simply
replicates the totally unregulated outcome. This provides a compelling argument against
the use of the ECPR in deregulated markets. Moreover, this argument gives validity to the
common complaint that the ECPR acts to maintain monopoly prots.45 (But see the
discussion in section 2.3.4 for why this complaint is not valid when the incumbents retail
tari¤ is controlled by regulation.) This policy contrasts with the preceding case where the
access charge is the instrument of policy, and where a low access charge translates directly
into low retail prices. Therefore, we can deduce that direct control of the access charge is
superior in terms of welfare compared to margin regulation. Indeed, in this perfect compe-
tition framework, pricing access at cost or a little lower in some cases, if feasible is then
the optimal policy.
2.6.2 Competitive Fringe Model
To investigate this topic in more detail, we return to the competitive fringe model with
bypass as in section 2.2.2. Therefore, the fringe equilibrium retail price is p =  (a), and
44This has a similar avor to the duopoly analysis in pages 2627 of La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a).
Those authors nd that a form of margin regulation where networks choose their access charge and then
the allowed retail prices must generate a specied margin facilitates collusion, i.e. that there is again no
downward pressure on retail prices.
45This point is forcefully made in section II(A) of Tye and Lapuerta (1996).
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Ms prot as a function of P and the access charge a is as given in (15) above. For a given
access charge a, the incumbent chooses P to maximize its prots, the solution to which has
the rst-order condition (16). Note that this may be rearranged to give
a = C2 +
 RP
zP| {z }
Ms lost retail prot
: (34)
This can again can be interpreted as an instance of the ECPR rule (17) above.46 The rst
term on the right-hand side of the above is the cost of providing access, while the second
is Ms loss in prots in the retail sector caused by supplying the marginal unit of access
to the fringe.47 In addition, since zP > 0 (34) implies that RP has the opposite sign to
(a  C2). This has a natural intuition: if access is priced above cost, the incumbent has an
incentive to push its retail price above the prot-maximizing level for the retail sector viewed
in isolation since it also wishes to stimulate demand for its protable access service. (The
reverse argument holds if a < C2.)
The prot-maximizing choice of P given a, denoted P (a), maximizes  in (15). In most
reasonable case it makes sense to assume that P 0(a) > 0, so that a higher regulated access
charge leads to a higher equilibrium retail price for the incumbent: the more protable
selling access to its rivals is, the less aggressively the incumbent will compete with rivals.
(The following analysis can easily be adapted if this assumption is invalid.) The welfare-
maximizing choice for a is derived as follows. Let (a) be the incumbents maximum prot
in (15) given a. Choosing a to maximize welfare V ( P (a);  (a)) + (a) implies that
 X P 0   x 0 + 0 = 0 ;
which, by using the envelope theorem for 0 and the fact that z = x 0, implies that
a = C2 + ( P (a)  C1)| {z }
ECPR access charge
  X
P 0
 za| {z }
mark-down to control P
(35)
where  is given in (28). Therefore the access charge should be below the ECPR level in
(27) given by the situation whereMs retail price was xed at P (a): the fact thatMs retail
price is unregulated implies that the access charge should be set below the ECPR level that
should apply if its retail price were xed. The intuition for this is clear. If controlling Ms
46One would not want to push this interpretation too far. In sections 2.3 and 2.4 we made the normative
point that the optimal access charge given a specic and xed retail price was the ECPR. In this section
we merely make the positive point that, for any given access charge, the unregulated incumbents choice of
retail price happens to have an ECPR avor.
47To cause a further unit of access to be demanded requires, for a given a, that P rises by an amount
1=zP ; which in turn causes prots in the retail sector to fall by the amount given in the formula.
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retail price were not an issue, section 2.4.2 argued that the optimal access charge was given
by the ECPR in (27). But now a reduction in a causes the retail price P to fall, which is
good for welfare. In sum, because Ms retail price is positively related to its access charge,
there is a need to reduce the access charge to below the ECPR level.48 (By contrast, in
the Ramsey problem it was optimal to raise the access charge from the ECPR level see
expression (31) above for the reason that an increase in the access charge there caused the
retail price to fall, since the access service then nanced more of the xed costs of the rm.)
Another natural comparison is between a and the cost of access C2. (The fact that a is
below the ECPR level says little about the comparison of a with C2.) In the previous section
with perfect competition, we saw that pricing access at cost or sometimes a little below
cost if this were feasible was the optimal policy. However, in this more general framework
it seems hard to obtain clear-cut results about whether a should be above or below cost, and
in general either can be optimal. However, in a few special cases the optimal access charge
should precisely equal cost:
 With no possibility for bypass and if the demand functions X and x are linear then
the regulator should set a = C2.49
 If there are no cross-market e¤ects then the regulator should set a = C2. (From (15)
the prot-maximizing retail price P does not depend on a in this case, and also  = 0,
therefore (35) implies that marginal cost pricing is optimal.)
However, in general it will simply be by chance that the optimal access charge is equal
to cost. As a result we expect that when bypass is a possibility the result will be productive
ine¢ ciency. The reason that it is hard to get clear-cut results in this framework is because
the access charge here is called upon to perform three tasks: (i) it is used to control the
market power of the incumbent (a lower value of a feeds through into a lower value for
P ); (ii) it is used to achieve allocative e¢ ciency given P using the second best argument
of section 2.3.3, and (iii) it is used to try to achieve productive e¢ ciency (which requires
a = C2) whenever there is a possibility for bypass. In general, motives (i) and (iii) argue for
an access charge no higher than cost. (When a = C2 the incumbent will choose P > C1,
and so choosing a < C2 will bring Ms retail price down towards cost. Motive (iii) will
merely temper but not overturn this incentive.) However, unless a is chosen to be so low
that P < C1, motive (ii) will give the regulator an incentive to raise a above cost see the
ECPR expression (27). Therefore, because of these forces pulling in di¤erent directions, it
is not possible to give clear guidance about the relationship between the access charge and
the cost of providing access in unregulated retail markets.
48A similar point is made in section III of Economides and White (1995). They show that when the
downstream market is unregulated it can be desirable to allow entry by an ine¢ cient rm something that
is achieved by choosing an access charge below the ECPR level if this causes retail prices to fall, i.e. it can
be a good thing to sacrice a little productive e¢ ciency to reduce allocative ine¢ ciency.
49See section 7 of La¤ont and Tirole (1994) and Armstrong and Vickers (1998).
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2.6.3 Partial Deregulation
In practice the incumbent rm often operates in retail markets that are partially regulated.50
Thus the rm may have discretion choosing its retail price in a given market, but only subject
to certain constraints on the overall pattern of its retail prices. There are two main kinds of
constraint that are commonly imposed. First, the incumbents retail tari¤could be controlled
by some kind of average price cap, so that it has freedom to vary relative retail prices subject
to an overall cap. In this case a decrease in one retail price say, in response to entry
then allows the rm to increase other retail prices. Second, the rm may face constraints
on price discrimination, so that it is free to determine the level of its retail prices but
faces constraints on the structure of relative prices (such as a geographically uniform tari¤
restriction). Here, if the rm decreases one price in response to entry then it is forced to
decrease other prices in related markets.
How is our analysis modied by these cross-market interactions? Suppose for simplicity
there are two retail markets, in one of which the incumbent faces entry and in the other no
threat from entry. Suppose also that consumer demand in the two markets is independent.
Write P1 to beMs price in the potentially more competitive market, and let P2 be the price
in its captive market. As usual, let a be the network access charge. In this case the rms
prot in (15) is modied to be
 = R2 (P2)| {z }
captive market
+ R1 (P1; a)| {z }
competitive market
+ (a  C2)z(P1; a)| {z }
access market
(36)
where R1 (P1; a)  (P1 C1)X1(P1;  (a)) isMs prot in the more competitive retail market,
R2 (P2) is its prot function in the captive market, and z(P1; a)   0(a)x(P1;  (a)) is the
fringe demand for the access needed for its activity in the competitive market.
Suppose that M is constrained by policy to choose P2 = (P1): When the rm faces an
average price cap, the relationship  is decreasing: a rise in P1 requires a fall in P2. By
contrast, a ban on price discrimination across the two markets could be represented by the
constraint P2 = P1, so that  is increasing. If we impose the constraint P2 = (P1) in (36),
write P1(a) to be the resulting prot-maximizing price P1 when the access charge is a. In
most reasonable cases we continue to have P1(a) being an increasing function of the access
charge: the more protable selling access to its rivals is, the less aggressively the incumbent
will compete when faced with entry. Then (35) is modied to be
a = C2 + ( P1(a)  C1)| {z }
ECPR access charge
  (X1 +X2
0) P 01
 za| {z }
correction to control P1;P2
: (37)
50See section 5 in Vickers (1997) and section 4.7 in La¤ont and Tirole (2000) for some discussion of this
topic. This topic is also closely related to the analysis of Armstrong and Vickers (1993), although there are
no vertical issues in that paper.
32
(Here  0 =  0( P1(a)) and X1 and X2 are the incumbents equilibrium demands in its two
retail markets.)
The e¤ect of the cross-market price constraints are then as follows. First there is an
e¤ect on the rms incentive to compete, as captured by P1 and P 01. In the case of a ban
on price discrimination we expect that, because the rm is reluctant to lose prots in its
captive market, it is less responsive to changes in the access charge. Indeed, in the limit
as prots in the captive market become the incumbents sole objective then P 01 = 0 and
(37) implies that the usual ECPR formula is then optimal. In e¤ect, the retail price in the
competitive market is now xed exogenously, and the earlier analysis of access pricing with
xed retail prices in section 2.4.2 goes through as before. In less extreme cases the presence
of the captive market will just temper the incumbents incentive to vary P1 in response to
policy towards the access charge, and the correction factor on the right-hand side of (37)
will correspondingly be reduced.
Secondly, when the rm operates under an average price cap, then typically this correction
factor will again be reduced, and the ECPR formula will again be closer to being optimal
than indicated in section 2.4.2. For instance, suppose that the price cap takes the xed
weights form: the incumbent must choose retail prices satisfying w1P1 + w2P2  P  for
some positive constants w1 and w2. In this case 
0   w1=w2. Suppose further that these
xed weights are chosen to be proportional to the equilibrium demands in the two markets,
so that w1=w2 = X1=X2.51 In this case the correction factor in (37) vanishes entirely, and the
ECPR is again valid. In this special case the captive market provides exactly the appropriate
correction factor to control the incumbents retail price in the competitive market, and the
access charge can be chosen as if the retail price in the more competitive market were xed.
2.7 Introducing Dynamic Issues
Until this point (as indeed it will be for the remainder of the chapter) the analysis has been
purely static. To see how this static analysis generalizes easily to encompass some dynamic
aspects, consider this simple extension to the no bypass model of section 2.3.3.52 Investment,
production and consumption take place at discrete points in time, t = 0; 1; :::, and suppose
that the prices for Ms product and Es product in period t are, respectively, Pt and pt.
Suppose that consumer surplus, and demand functions for the incumbents and fringes
products in period t are, respectively, Vt(Pt; pt), Xt(Pt; pt) and xt(Pt; pt). (We assume there
51Section 2.2.2 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000) discusses this form of average price regulation in more detail.
In particular, they show that, in the absence of competition, this form of price regulation leads to Ramsey-like
prices.
52The following extends the analysis in section 4.4.1.3 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000). See Hausman and
Sidak (1999) and Jorde, Sidak, and Teece (2000) for analyses of the important issue of how dynamic access
price regulation a¤ects the incumbents incentive to innovate and upgrade its network. For a full treatment
of dynamic issues in access pricing which emphasizes the problem of commitment and expropriation in
regulatory policy, see Sidak and Spulber (1996), Sidak and Spulber (1997a) and Sidak and Spulber (1997b).
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are no intertemporal linkages in demand.) Over time the incumbent invests in a network
which supplies access, and suppose that one unit of access is needed to provide one unit of
retail service, either by M or by E. Suppose that the capacity of the network at time t,
which determines the total number of units of retail service that can be generated by the
network, is Kt. Capacity depreciates at the proportional rate . There are constant returns
to scale in installing capacity, and suppose that installing a unit of capacity in period t costs
t. Let It be the amount of investment (in money terms) in period t, so that the amount of
new capacity installed in period t is It=t. Then capacity evolves according to the dynamic
relation
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It+1
t+1
: (38)
(We suppose that the current periods investment can be used with immediate e¤ect.)
What is the marginal cost of providing an extra unit of access in period t? Suppose the
investment plan is Kt; Kt+1; :::; It; It+1; ::: satisfying (38). If Kt is increased by 1, then all
subsequent values for K and I are unchanged provided that next periods investment It+1
is reduced so as to the keep the right-hand side of (38) constant, i.e. if It+1 is reduced by
(1   )t+1.53 If the interest rate is r, so that $1 next period is worth $ 11+r now, then the
net cost of this modication to the investment plan is
LRICt = t  
1  
1 + r
t+1 :
(The notation LRIC is used to stand for long-run incremental cost, the term often used
in policy debates.) If technical progress causes the unit cost of new capacity to fall at the
exogenous rate  every period, then t+1 = (1  )t. With technical progress , the above
formula reduces to
LRICt = t

1  (1  )(1  )
1 + r

: (39)
Notice that if the parameters ; r and  are each reasonably small, this formula is approxi-
mated by LRICt  t(r +  + ).54
Suppose that it costs M and E an amount Ct and ct respectively to convert a unit of
access into their nal retail services. Let at be the access charge paid by E in period t. Then
competition implies that the fringes price in period t is pt = at + ct, and total discounted
welfare is
W =
X
t
1
(1 + r)t
fVt +Xt(Pt   Ct) + xtat   Itg ;
53I assume that demand conditions are such that investment in each period is strictly positive, which
ensures that this modication is feasible.
54This is a familar equation in continuous time investment models see for instance expression (7) in
Biglaiser and Riordan (2000).
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where Kt  Xt + xt and this capital stock evolves according to (38). (All functions in the
above are evaluated at the prices Pt and pt = at + ct.) Since (38) implies that
It = t [Xt + xt   (1  )(Xt 1 + xt 1)] ;
substituting this value for investment into the expression for welfare W yields
W =
X
t
1
(1 + r)t
fVt +Xt(Pt   Ct) + xtat   t [Xt + xt   (1  )(Xt 1 + xt 1)]g :
Maximizing this with respect to Pt and at yields
@Xt
@Pt
(Pt   Ct) + @xt
@Pt
at   t
@[Xt + xt]
@Pt

+
1
1 + r

(1  )t+1
@[Xt + xt]
@Pt

= 0

@Xt
@pt
(Pt   Ct) + @xt
@pt
at   t
@[Xt + xt]
@pt

+
1
1 + r

(1  )t+1
@[Xt + xt]
@pt

= 0 : (40)
Together these imply that the access charge should be given by at = LRICt in (39), and
that Pt = Ct + at. Thus, as expected in this constant-returns-to-scale world with all prices
chosen to maximize welfare, it is optimal to set all charges equal to the relevant marginal
costs. In particularly, it is optimal at each point in time to set at equal to the correctly
calculated marginal cost (which falls at the rate of technical progress  each period).
In order to bring out the similarities with section 2.3, we next calculate optimal access
charges fatg for a given time-path for the incumbents retail prices fPtg. These are derived
from the single expression (40) above, which can be simplied. As in (6), if we write
t =
@Xt=@pt
 @xt=@pt
for the demand substitution parameter in period t, then (40) simplies to
at = LRICt| {z }
access cost in t
+ t [Pt   Ct   LRICt]| {z }
lost retail prot in t
where LRICt is given in (39). This is just a dynamic version of the ECPR rule (23) derived
above. Thus we see that the formulae generated in the simple static models extend in a
straightforward way to simple dynamic models.55
55For further analysis of the dynamic access pricing problem, focussing on the issue of how to encourage
multiple networks to provide infrastructure investments at the e¢ cient level, see Gans and Williams (1999)
and Gans (2001).
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2.8 Controversies and Conclusions
It is hard to nd a more controversial issue in industrial policy than that concerning the
terms on which entrants can gain access to an incumbent rms network. In this section I
try to summarize the main insights generated by the analysis, and how these can shed light
on the current policy debates.
Three broad kinds of access charging policy are:
1. Pricing access at cost,
2. Ramsey pricing, i.e. choosing the incumbents retail prices and access charges simul-
taneously to maximize welfare, and
3. the ECPR, i.e. pricing access at the cost of access plus the incumbents opportunity
cost.
Economic opinion on the applicability of these policies often seems to be extremely polar-
ized, and cost-based access charges and ECPR-based access charges both have their fervent
supporters. As usual, though, the relative merits of these policies depends on the specics
of each case, and these are discussed in turn.
2.8.1 Cost-Based Access Charges
The chief benets of cost-based access charges are twofold. First, they are relatively simple
to implement. (Or at least as simple as estimating the incumbents network costs, something
which is needed for all reasonable access pricing policies.) In particular, to calculate these
charges no information is needed about subscriber demand, nor about the characteristics of
entrants (at least in the simple models presented above). Second, this is the only access
pricing policy that gives the correct make-or-buy signals to entrants when bypass is a
possibility. For instance, pricing access above cost could mean that an entrant would prefer
to bypass the incumbents network and construct its own network, even though it would be
more e¢ cient to use the incumbents network. A third, and less clear-cut, benet of such
charges is that they are fair and non-discriminatory, and do not depend upon the use
which is made of the incumbents network by rivals. Therefore, under this regime di¤erent
entrants will not be o¤ered di¤erent wholesale terms by the incumbent.
In simple terms, cost based access charges are appropriate when access charges do not
need to perform the additional role of correcting for distortions in the incumbents retail
tari¤. There are three main reasons why such a task might not be necessary:
1. First, if the incumbents regulated retail tari¤ does reect its underlying costs accu-
rately then no second-bestcorrective measures are needed at all, and in such cases
access charges should also reect the relevant costs. In sum, a full and e¤ective re-
balancing of the incumbents tari¤ greatly simplies the regulatory task, and allows
access charges to perform the focussed task of ensuring productive e¢ ciency.
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2. Second, if there are distortions present in the regulated tari¤, but the second-best
corrections are made via another regulatory instrument (such as an output tax levied
on entrants), then access charges need not perform this additional task, and so again
can safely reect costs see sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.2 above. Indeed, one of the main
aims of this analysis has been to argue that cost-based access pricing is the best
policy, provided that the incumbents retail distortions are more directly tackled by,
for instance, a well-designed universal service fund.
3. Third, when the incumbent operates in a vigorously competitive retail market and
is free to set its own retail tari¤, we argued that pricing access at cost was a good
policy see section 2.6.1 above. The fact that the downstream sector is competitive
implies that the incumbent has no signicant opportunity costs, and so once again
access charges should reect costs.
However, in other cases i.e. when opportunity cost considerations apply and when
access charges are required to correct for these we have seen that pricing access at cost is
sub-optimal.
2.8.2 Ramsey Pricing
Almost by denition, Ramsey pricing is the best way to set access (and other) prices. Once
the regulator has chosen a measure of social welfare which could include special care being
taken over the welfare of certain subscriber groups then the optimal policy is to choose
access and retail charges to maximize this welfare function, subject to constraints on the
protability of the rm and/or the costs of public funds. This is clearly superior to a policy
whereby retail prices are (somehow) chosen rst, perhaps without regard for how access
charges will subsequently be chosen, and access charges are then chosen taking this retail
tari¤ as given. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that in practice Ramsey pricing principles
are not often heeded for regulated retail tari¤s, and access charges are left to correct for the
various resulting retail distortions. One possible reason for this is that retail tari¤s are much
more visiblethan access charges, and decision makers are more susceptible to public and
political pressure when they choose these. (This is not to deny that rms in the industry
are a powerful lobbying force when it comes to inuencing the access charging regime.)
A common argument against the use of Ramsey prices is that they are very information-
ally demanding, and that compared to, say, cost-based prices, they require knowledge about
demand elasticities and so on, which the regulator simply does not have. While it is broadly
true that regulatory bodies do not in fact possess this kind of detailed market information,
this is not to say that with further e¤ort they could not obtain reasonable estimates of these
data. Alternatively, ways could perhaps be found to delegate pricing decisions to the rm,
which will most likely be much better informed than the regulator about the market in
which it operates. The global price cap proposed in section 4.7 of La¤ont and Tirole (2000)
provides one framework in which to do this.
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Another, more dubious, argument is that Ramsey-style access charges are discrimina-
tory, in the sense that the charge a rival must pay for a given access service will depend
on the use to which this service is put. Our formula (32), for instance, shows that, as well
as the cost of providing access, the access charge should depend on (i) the incumbents
(endogenous) price-cost margin in the relevant retail market, (ii) the displacement ratio ,
which takes account of demand-side substitution possibilities as well as supply-side bypass
possibilities, and (iii) the elasticity of demand for access. Each of these factors will depend
on the particular use made of the access service. But the point is that this is desirable:
Ramsey charges are the least-baddepartures from cost-based charges, and access charges
should be higher when used for those services that do not generate large welfare losses when
signicant price-cost markups are imposed.
It is fair to say the Ramsey approach does not enjoy the same passionate level of support
or disparagement from economists as do the other two policies. One might speculate that
this is because the policy is not strongly supported by either incumbents or entrants in the
industry. (Very roughly, cost-based access pricing is supported by entrants, whereas the
ECPR, in its simple forms at least, is supported by incumbents.) In regulatory hearings
around the world, these rms nd economists to support their respective cases, but there is
no well-funded entity that argues strongly for Ramsey-style pricing of incumbent services.
2.8.3 The ECPR
The ECPR must be one of the more misunderstood formulas in industrial economics see
section 2.3.1 for a variety of interpretations. The analysis in this section has argued, broadly
speaking, that with our preferred version of the rule as given by (17) the rule is valid when
(a) the incumbents retail tari¤ is xed in advance and is not a¤ected by any actions of
the rivals, and (b) when other instruments, such as an output tax levied on rivals, are not
available to correct for the incumbents retail market distortions. In particular, the rule has
little relevance when the incumbent is free to choose its retail tari¤, and in some cases it does
nothing to constrain incumbent monopoly power see section 2.6. (However, with partial
deregulation the rule tends to perform better.)
In the guise of the margin rule (20) it has the virtue of simplicity and being informationally
undemanding (at least when compared to the Ramsey approach). All that needs to be known
is the incumbents retail price and its avoidable costs in the retail segment. However, this
margin rule is simply not appropriate except in a few special cases, such as the one discussed
in section 2.3.2 for instance. If the margin rule is used as a basis for policy then ine¢ ciencies
will result in situations where (i) the rivals product does not substitute one-for-one for the
incumbents, or (ii) where rivals have some ability to bypass the incumbents access service.
On the other hand, our preferred version of the ECPR, as represented by (17), is, outside
these same special cases, informationally demanding, and various awkward elasticities appear
in our expressions for opportunity cost. This suggests that the apparent contrast between
the simpleECPR approach and the complexand informationally demanding Ramsey
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approach may just be a misleading artefact of simple examples with extreme elasticities.
Indeed, the two approaches can be quite similar. This point is illustrated by the close
relationship between the ECPR and the Ramsey approach indicated in our formulas (31)
and (32). Thus the di¤erence between the two approaches simply has to do with the social
cost of public funds. There would be a second source of di¤erence related to demand cross-
elasticities, and so on, if the ECPR were identied with the simple margin rule, but to do
so would be to use the wrong measure of opportunity cost.
It is clear that for both ECPR-style pricing and Ramsey-style pricing there is a formi-
dable need for information about demand and supply elasticities. Estimation of the relevant
elasticities will inevitably be imperfect, and estimation errors imply e¢ ciency losses. The
extent of those losses can, however, be diminished if the incumbents prot on retail sales
can be reduced for example, by allowing cost-reective tari¤ rebalancing.
3 Competitive Bottlenecks
This section is a bridge between the two main sections of the chapter, and discusses the case
of what might be termed competitive bottlenecks. The discussion is framed in terms of
two applications: call termination on mobile telephony (in section 3.1) and access pricing
for competing internet networks (section 3.2). The basic underlying features of these kinds
of markets include: (i) there are several networks competing vigorously for the same pool
of subscribers, and (ii) even though networks compete vigorously for subscribers, they often
have a monopoly position in providing communications services to their subscribers. In such
markets it is undesirable to leave network access arrangements entirely to the discretion of
individual networks: there is, at the least, a role for coordination between networks, and in
many cases a role for regulatory intervention to set access charges at the appropriate level.
3.1 Mobile Call Termination
First consider the market for mobile telephony.56 Here the features to emphasize are that
each subscriber has only one channel of communication, so that there is no dual sourcing
of mobile telephony, and that tari¤ arrangements are such that the caller pays for the whole
cost of the call. Given that these conditions are satised then, when a subscriber signs up
with a network, that network has a monopoly over delivering calls to the subscriber, and
it can extract monopoly prots from the callers to this subscriber. Even if the market for
subscribers is intense, so that overall prots are eliminated in the sector, these monopoly
prots and the consequent deadweight losses persist and can be used to nance subsidized
retail tari¤s o¤ered to attract subscribers.
56This section is based on Armstrong (1997). See also Hausman (2000), Wright (1999a) and Gans and
King (2000) for further analysis.
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This topic is analyzed rst in a simple model that makes the main points most clearly,
and then various generalizations are discussed. Suppose, then, that there are two telecom-
munications sectors: xed and mobile. In this benchmark model the latter is assumed to
be competitive, and all mobile charges except possibly for call termination are unregulated.
The simplifying assumptions in this section are:
Assumption 1: All calls made from mobile networks are terminated on the xed sector;
Assumption 2: Mobile subscribers gain no utility from receiving calls;
Assumption 3: Mobile subscribers do not care about the welfare of the people who call
them;
Assumption 4: Mobile subscribers do not pay anything for receiving calls made to them;
Assumption 5: The mobile sector is perfectly competitive.
We make Assumption 1 so that the charge for call termination on mobile networks does not
a¤ect the cost for making calls from mobile networks.57
The cost structure of a mobile network is assumed to consist of a xed cost k per sub-
scriber, a constant marginal cost cO for outbound calls (by Assumption 1, these are always
made to the xed sector) and a constant marginal cost cT for terminating calls from the xed
sector. (All mobile networks are assumed to be identical.) The outbound cost cO includes
any termination payments made to the xed sector, which are assumed to be constant in
this analysis. The xed per-subscriber cost k is the cost of a mobile handset together with
any other costs associated with managing subscribers (such as billing costs). In sum, if
a subscriber receives Q calls and makes q calls, a networks costs for that subscriber are
cTQ+ cOq + k:
Fixed network operators are required to pay a charge a per call to a mobile network for call
termination. Suppose that with this charge the retail price for calls from the xed network
to the mobile network is P (a). (If di¤erent mobile networks choose di¤erent termination
charges, then this is reected in di¤erent call charges from the xed sector.) With a given
xed-to-mobile price P , suppose each subscriber on a mobile network receives Q(P ) calls
from the xed sector. Suppose a mobile network o¤ers its subscribers a xed charge f and
a per-call charge p for making calls. Suppose that once a subscriber has joined a mobile
network with per-call charge p, that subscriber makes a quantity q(p) of outbound calls.
(This is assumed for now not to depend on the price of incoming calls P .) Then a mobile
57If Assumption 1 does not hold then the analysis becomes closely related to the next section on two
wayaccess pricing. In fact, the nal model in section 4.2.4 below is closely related to the model presented
here, but allows for tra¢ c between mobilenetworks. The analysis there is simplied by the assumption
that the fraction of calls that are made to other subscribers on the same mobile network is assumed to be
negligible. Wright (1999a) and Gans and King (2000) also allow for mobile-to-mobile calls, and moreover
allow subscribers on the same network to call each other. This feature complicates the analysis considerably.
However, many of the conclusions of their analysis are similar to those presented here; in particular, they
nd that prots from high termination charges are used to attract mobile subscribers.
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networks prot per subscriber is
 = (p  cO)q(p) + f   k| {z }
prot from subscription
+ (a  cT )Q(P (a))| {z }
prot from termination
: (41)
From Assumption 5 equilibrium in the mobile sector is such that (i) operatorsoverall
prots  are driven down to zero, and (ii) subscriber utility is maximized subject to a
networks break-even constraint. The consumer surplus of each mobile subscriber is v(p) f ,
where v0(p)   q(p). From Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 this competitive equilibrium involves
marginal cost pricing for outbound calls, so that p = cO, and the xed subscriber charge
recovers any prot shortfall, so that from (41) we have
f = k   (a  cT )Q(P (a)) : (42)
This implies that the choice of termination charge a has no e¤ect on the charge for outbound
calls p, but only on the xed charge f . Thus, if a is above the cost of call termination then
(a cT )Q(P (a)) > 0 and a mobile operator subsidizes the retail charge for network connection
in the sense that f < k. Thus in this particular model handset subsidies, which are a feature
of many mobile markets, are a direct result of charging for call termination above cost.58
3.1.1 Unregulated Termination Charges
Suppose rst that mobile networks are free to choose all their charges, including termination
charges. In this model it is clear what will happen: competition will drive overall prots to
zero, but networks in equilibrium must maximize their prots from call termination in (41).
Therefore, a is chosen to maximize
(a  cT )Q(P (a)) : (43)
Call this unregulated termination charge amon for future reference. Thus, even with perfect
competition for mobile subscribers, there is no competition for providing access to mobile
subscribers. In particular, call termination is not charged for at the correct rate, and there
is a role for regulatory intervention.59 The socially optimal access charge is analyzed in the
next section.
58In some ways this mechanism is similar to that which functions in markets with switching costs see
Klemperer (1995). When consumers incur switching costs for changing their supplier for a given service,
a supplier has a degree of market power once a consumer has been signed up. Therefore, in competitive
markets, suppliers will o¤er subsidized initial deals, these being funded out of the future prots generated
once consumers become locked in. The di¤erence between the two cases is with switching costsit is original
consumers future selfwho is exploited, whereas in the competitive bottleneck case it is other people
who su¤er.
59In some situations this monopoly access price could be extremely high. For instance, Gans and King
(2000) discuss the case where the price of calls to mobiles is a function of the average cost of call termination
across all mobile networks. (One reason for this might be that xed subscribers are ignorant about the
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Before that, however, it is convenient to discuss the case where subscribers do care about
receiving calls, since this is sometimes used as an argument for why call termination is not
necessarily a bottleneckin the sector. So suppose that Assumption 2 does not hold, and
that each mobile subscriber gains utility b per call from the xed sector, in addition to the
direct utility from making calls of v(p)  f . Therefore, with the termination charge a total
subscriber utility is v(p)+bQ(P (a)) f:Maximizing this expression subject to prots in (41)
being non-negative implies that the equilibrium unregulated termination charge maximizes
(a  [cT   b])Q(P (a)) : (44)
Thus, comparing (43) with (44) we see that the e¤ect of introducing call externalities is
indeed to reduce the equilibrium unregulated termination charge. (In fact, the e¤ect is
precisely as if the cost of termination is reduced by the factor b.) In the next section we
discuss, among other things, whether this is a good argument for not regulating such charges.
3.1.2 Regulated Termination Charges
For now, return to the case where subscribers do not value incoming calls. To derive the
optimal termination charge we initially make three further simplifying assumptions:
Assumption 6: The number of mobile subscribers is not a¤ected by tari¤s in the mobile
market (over the relevant range of tari¤s);
Assumption 7: The price of calls from the xed to the mobile sector is equal to perceived
marginal cost;
Assumption 8: Changes in the xed-to-mobile call price have no e¤ect on the demand for
any other services o¤ered by the xed sector.
Assumption 7 might hold either because of competition in the xed sector or because of
optimal regulation in the xed sector. If the marginal cost on the xed network for making
calls to the point of interconnect with mobile networks is C, then the total perceived marginal
cost of calling a mobile subscriber is C+a. Assumption 7 therefore implies that P (a)  C+a.
Consumer surplus per mobile subscriber in the market for calls to mobile subscribers,
when that price is P , is V (P ), where V 0(P )   Q(P ). Therefore, from (42) and Assumptions
6, 7 and 8, total welfare per mobile subscriber when the termination charge is a is
W = V (C + a)| {z }
utility of callers to mobiles
+ v(cO) + (a  cT )Q(C + a)  k| {z }
utility of mobile subscribers
: (45)
mobile network they are trying to call and about the associated tari¤. They therefore base their calling
decisions on the average charges for calls to mobiles.) In this case a small mobile networks access charge has
a negligible e¤ect on the average call termination charge, with the result that its monopoly access charge
will be very high indeed.
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(Prot in both sectors is zero, and Assumption 8 implies that the xed-to-mobile price
has no e¤ect on other prots in the xed sector. Assumption 6 implies that welfare per
mobile subscriber is an accurate and well-dened measure of total welfare.) This expression is
maximized by setting a = cT , so that there should be marginal cost pricing of call termination
under our assumptions. This in turn implies that f = k in equilibrium, and there are no
handset or other subsidies for mobile network connection at the optimum. Although mobile
subscribers certainly benet from high termination charges since their network connection
is subsidized as a result this benet is more than outweighed by the costs this imposes on
their callers.
Although this simple model captures some important features of the market, it ignores a
number of important aspects. The next section adapts the model to discuss the determination
of access charges in more complex environments.
3.1.3 Extensions
Price of xed-to-mobile calls not equal to cost : Suppose that Assumption 7 does not hold,
and that the price of calls to mobile subscribers is above the perceived marginal cost. This
might be, for instance, because regulation in the xed sector required that call charges be
above cost in order to fund social obligations, or because this call charge is unregulated.
Then, with no other modications to the above benchmark model, it is optimal to have the
termination charge be such that the price of calls to mobile subscribers equal to the actual
cost of making such calls, i.e. so that P (a) = C + cT . When P (a) > C + a this obviously
implies that a < cT , and so it is optimal to subsidize call termination on mobile networks in
order to counteract the price-cost mark-up in the xed-to-mobile call market.
Allowing for network externalities: Suppose next that Assumption 6 does not hold, so that
the number of mobile subscribers is elastic.60 Specically, if U = v(p)   f is the net sur-
plus o¤ered by the mobile networks, suppose that the total consumer surplus of the mobile
subscribers is (U) and the number of mobile subscribers is N(U) = 0(U), where N() is
an increasing function. (We assume that potential mobile subscribers di¤er only in their
willingness to subscribe, and not in the number of calls they make once they do subscribe.)
Callers on the xed network benet from higher mobile subscription, as there are then
more people to call on the mobile network. As above, suppose that Q(P ) is the number of
xed-to-mobile calls per mobile subscriber, which is assumed not to depend on the number
of mobile subscribers. The fact that all potential mobile subscribers are equally valuable
to xed subscribers, which is what this constant calls per mobile subscriber assumption
60Section 5 of Wright (1999a) also discusses this issue, but in a more complicated model where mobile
networks have some market power. However, he too obtains the result that when market participation is
sensitive to mobile tari¤s it is optimal to set the mobile termination charge above cost. More generally, much
of the analysis in Willig (1979) is to do with tari¤ design in the presence of network and call externalities.
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implies, means that the network externalityis linear in the number of mobile subscribers.
In particular, consumer surplus in the xed sector is NV (P ) when there are N mobile
subscribers and the xed-to-mobile call charge is P .
As before, overall mobile network prots are zero and mobile subscriber utility is max-
imized given this zero prot constraint. This again implies that p = cO and f is given by
(42), so that U(a) = v(cO) + (a  cT )Q(C + a)  k. For values of a less than amon in section
3.1.1, U(a) is increasing in a since a higher termination charge increases the prots from call
termination, which then translates into a lower xed charge f . This in turn translates into
higher subscriber numbers for the mobile sector. Total welfare, which was previously given
by (45), is now
W = N(U(a))V (C + a)| {z }
utility of callers to mobiles
+ (U(a))| {z } :
utility of mobile subscribers
Maximizing this with respect to a gives the rst-order condition
a = cT +
N 0(U(a))U 0(a)V (C + a)
 NQ0(C + a)  c
T :
Therefore, unless N 0 = 0, so that mobile subscription is totally inelastic as in the previous
section, the network externality e¤ect implies that it is optimal to set the mobile call termi-
nation charge above cost. The reason for this is clear: a higher termination charge raises the
equilibrium mobile subscriber utility via handset subsidies and the like, this in turn increases
mobile subscription, which in turn raises the utility of xed network subscribers because of
the network externality e¤ect.
However, even though the presence of network externalities gives a reason for pricing call
termination above cost, the optimal termination charge is still lower than the unregulated
charge amon in section 3.1.1 above.61 Therefore, the realistic assumption that network exter-
nalities are important in mobile telephony does not provide a good argument for deregulating
mobile call termination charges.62
Allowing for call externalities: As was earlier mentioned in section 3.1.1, suppose a subscriber
gains utility b from receiving each call. Given Assumption 7 welfare per mobile subscriber
is modied from (45) to
W = V (C + a) + v(cO) + bQ(C + a) + (a  cT )Q(C + a)  k :
61The regulator would not choose a termination charge above amon since both mobile subscribers and
callers to mobiles would be made better o¤ by reducing a down to amon. Also, welfare is increased by
reducing a at least a little below amon since this has only a second-order e¤ect on U (and hence on mobile
subscriber numbers) and yet yields a rst-order benet for callers to mobile subscribers.
62In any event, it is possible that there exist superior ways to fund the (desirable) subsidy to mobile
subscribers instead of imposing a price-cost margin on the price of calls from xed-to-mobile networks.
(Perhaps a small tax on the whole industry would be less distortionary than a big tax on one sector?)
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The optimal termination charge therefore satises the rst-order condition
a = cT   b < cT : (46)
Therefore, if mobile subscribers derive a benet from incoming calls, then the regulator
should set the termination charge below cost in order to encourage calls from the xed
sector.
This result means that the presence of call externalities is not a good reason to de-regulate
call termination. In section 3.1.1 we showed that call externalities did cause networks to
reduce their termination charges, in order to stimulate demand for calls to their subscribers.
However, we have also seen that call externalities act to reduce the socially optimal charge.
Comparing (46) with (44) we see that unregulated networks still price termination in excess
of the socially optimal level.
Allowing subscribers to care about their callers: This extension provides a better argument
for de-regulating call termination. Suppose next that Assumption 3 does not hold, and
for simplicity suppose that mobile subscribers internalize the entire welfare of those who
call them when they choose their mobile network. (For instance, if the regular callers are
family members or close friends, this might be a good approximation.) Mobile networks will
still compete away all prots, and total welfare of mobile subscribers which now includes
that of callers on the xed network is maximized subject to this break-even constraint.
Suppose that mobile rms are free to choose their own termination charge. If Assumption 7
continues to hold, then it is clear that marginal cost pricing will be the equilibrium outcome:
p = cO; f = k and a = cT . Therefore, if mobile subscribers and those who call them are
mostly closely-knit groups, the need for the control of mobile call termination in a competitive
market is much reduced.
Allowing for charging for incoming calls: In some countries, such as the United States, the
arrangement is that calls from the xed to the mobile sector are charged at regular xed
network tari¤s, and the recipient of the call also makes a payment per call to cover the
additional cost of terminating on mobile networks.63
To be concrete, suppose that it is now the mobile subscriber who pays for call termination,
not the caller. Then Assumption 7 states that with this arrangement we have P = C. If
a mobile network charges a per call to its subscribers for receiving incoming calls, then its
overall prot from its subscribers is modied from (41) to be
 = (p  cO)q(p) + f   k + (a  cT )Q(C) :
63This arrangement is often due to country-specic numbering issues, such as callers being unable to
distinguish mobile and xed telephone numbers due to the former having no distinct number ranges. See
Kim and Lim (2001), Hermalin and Katz (2001) and Jeon, La¤ont, and Tirole (2004) for analysis of the
general issue of reception charges in telecommunications.
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If mobile subscribers have no choice but to accept incoming calls, being charged for these
calls is exactly equivalent to increasing the xed charge.64 (Recall that all mobile subscribers
receive the same, known, number of calls in this model.) Therefore, the balance between
the xed charge f and the incoming call charge a is not determined here. Equilibrium here
involves p = cO, as usual, and f + (a   cT )Q(C) = k, so that all other charges cover the
mobile networks xed costs.
Clearly the distortion is no longer that mobile operators exploit their market power over
delivering calls to their subscribers that problem has been eliminated in competitive mar-
kets by making mobile subscribers themselves pay for call termination but that callers on
the xed networks now pay too little. (The price P should, in the absence of call externali-
ties, be equal to the total cost C + cT rather than just C.) Of course, it is just possible that
one market failure will cancel out another, and if there is a call externality b that is precisely
equal to the termination cost cT , this receiver-pays tari¤ arrangement might be desirable.
However, the two e¤ects are again quite di¤erent, and the presence of call externalities is
not in itself an argument for making call recipients rather than callers cover the cost of call
termination.
Allowing for partial substitution between xed and mobile sectors: Finally, suppose that
Assumption 8 does not hold. There are several ways in which charges for calls to and
from the mobile sector a¤ect the take-up of other services provided by the xed sector.
For instance, low charges for mobile service could cause some subscribers to leave the xed
network altogether and make all their calls on their mobile network, which of course reduces
the demand for xed services. Alternatively, consider a person who subscribes to both xed
and mobile services. Since calls to this person using the two networks are substitutes, we
imagine a reduction in the price of xed-to-mobile calls would, all else equal, reduce the
demand for xed-to-xed calls. For simplicity, we focus on the second of these two kinds of
substitutability.
Suppose that, if the xed-to-mobile call charge is P , total prots (per mobile subscriber)
in the rest of the xed sector are (P ): (We suppose that charges for all other xed services
are not a¤ected by policy towards the mobile sector.) Assumption 7 implies that total welfare
is modied from (45) to
(C + a) + V (C + a) + v(cO) + (a  cT )Q(C + a)  k :
(Here, V (P ) is consumer surplus in the xed sector keeping all other xed sector charges
constant.) Maximizing this with respect to a implies that
a = cT +
0(C + a)
 Q0(C + a) : (47)
64The papers mentioned in the previous footnote allow the call recipient to cut short, or not accept, a call
if the charge outweighs the benet of being called.
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Thus the sign of (a   cT ) is the same as that of 0. It is plausible that 0 is positive since
increasing the xed-to-mobile price will increase the demand for xed-to-xed services, which
will usually add to prots. If this is so then it is optimal to set the termination charge above
cost, in order to stimulate demand for (protable) xed-to-xed services. Expression (47) is
a variant of the ECPR formula (17). In order to provide the marginal unit of access to the
xed sector, the mobile termination charge must increase by 1=Q0. Therefore, the second
term in the above expression is the lost prot in the xed sector caused by the mobile sector
supplying a unit of access.
3.2 Access Charges for the Internet
A market that in several ways is quite similar to that of the above model of mobile telephony
is the internet. A simple model of the internet has two classes of agent: web-site providers
(who provide information and content of various kinds) and consumers (who wish to obtain
content provided on the web-sites).65 In this simple model, all information ows are one
way, from web-sites to consumers. Consumers obtain utility from viewing content on the
websites, and web-site providers obtain utility from consumers visiting their web-sites. There
are several di¤erent means by which web-site providers might obtain utility from consumers.
A commercial web-site might sell content to visitors, either electronically (such as an
economics journal being published electronically) or acting as an on-line retailer for other
kinds of products (such as Amazon.com). Alternatively, a web-site provider might gain
utility even if there is no direct payment from the visitor. For instance, it might make
money from providing advertisements to its visitors, from providing useful information about
a rms products (which are then purchased by conventional means), from saving money on
conventional postage when content is downloaded from the site, or it might simply obtain
utility from knowing people have visited the site. For simplicity, in this section we consider
the second kind of web-site, and suppose that web-site providers do not charge consumers
directly for entry to the site.
Consider rst a benchmark model where the number of consumers and the number of web-
sites is exogenously xed (provided that some reservation level of utility is obtained by the
two groups), with the number in each group being normalized to 1. Suppose each consumer
obtains utility u from visiting each web-site, and each web-site obtains utility u^ from each
consumer who visits it. There are a number of identical internet networks operating in a
perfectly competitive market. The total cost of carrying a unit of communication from a
web-site to a consumer is cO + cT , where cO is the cost of originating communication from
the web-site and cT is the cost of terminating the communication to the consumer. If a
consumer connected to one network visits a web-site hosted on a rival network, the host
network incurs the cost cO while the terminating network incurs the cost cT .
65The following discussion is based on La¤ont, Marcus, Rey, and Tirole (2001). See also chapter 7 of
La¤ont and Tirole (2000) and Little and Wright (2000).
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Since the act of a consumer visiting a web-site benets both parties it is similar to the
above model of mobile telephony with the extension to allow for call externalities it is not
obvious whether the terminating network should be paid by the originating network or vice
versa. Here we adopt the convention that the web-sites network pays the access charge a
to the consumers network for delivering the communication. If a is negative, however, this
arrangement implies that the web-sites network is paid for providing the service of delivering
the communication to the consumers network. Turning to the retail side, suppose network
i charges its consumers pi each time they access any web-site and charges its web-sites p^i
each time any consumer visits them.
Putting all of this together implies that if network i attracts ni consumers and n^i web-
sites, its total prots are
i = n^i(p^i   cO   nicT   (1  ni)a)| {z }
prots from web-sites
+ ni(1  n^i)(a  cT )| {z }
prots from call termination
+ nipi|{z} :
prots from reception charges
(Note that the cost allocation involved in this decomposition is quite arbitrary, as we have
loaded all of the costs involved in completing callsonto the web-site segment of market.)
This can be simplied to
i = ni(pi + a  cT ) + n^i(p^i   a  cO) : (48)
Therefore, the prots of a network can be decomposed into those generated by selling services
to web-site providers and those generated by its services to consumers. The e¤ective marginal
cost of providing services to consumers is cT a, while the e¤ective marginal cost of providing
services to web-sites is cO + a.
Given the assumption of perfect competition between networks, equilibrium prices are
driven down to the associated marginal costs:
pi = c
T   a ; p^i = cO + a (49)
and network prots are zero.66 Thus, the choice of regulated access charge a¤ects the balance
of retail charges o¤ered to consumers and to web-site providers in equilibrium. If there is no
access charge for interconnection, so a bill and keepsystem is used, then consumers are
charged the cost of terminating communications to them, while web-sites are charged the
cost of originating communication. By contrast, if access is charged at termination cost, so
that a = cT , then consumers pay nothing for using the internet while web-sites pay the full
cost of providing communication. Alternatively, if the originating network can recover its
costs, so that a =  cO, then the reverse holds.
66For this result to be valid, these candidate prices must not exceed the agentsreservation utilities, so
that the access charge should satisfy u^  cO > a > cT   u:
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Notice in particular that a networks charging strategy involves setting its retail prices
as though all terminating tra¢ c came from rival networks and as though all originating
tra¢ c was to be terminated on rival networks. For instance, a web-site connected to a given
network will have a fraction of visits from consumers connected to the same network, and
yet the origination charge is cO + a which is the cost of sending communications to a rival
network. La¤ont, Marcus, Rey, and Tirole (2001) call this result the o¤-net-cost pricing
principle.67
While this simple model with inelastic demand is suitable for demonstrating how the
access charge feeds through into retail charges in equilibrium, it is incapable of analyzing
the normative issue of the optimal level of the access charge. (As long as all consumers and
web-site providers are served, welfare is not a¤ected by the balance between the two retail
charges.) Therefore, we next extend the model to allow for some responses to prices. One
way to do this is to suppose that there is elastic consumer demand for visiting web-sites
(but the number of web-sites remains xed). If the price for receiving tra¢ c is p, suppose
that each consumer makes q(p) visits to each web-site. Otherwise, everything is as described
above. Then, after some manipulation, (48) becomes
i = niq(pi)(pi + a  cT ) + n^i [niq(pi) + (1  ni)q(p)] (p^i   a  cO) ;
where p is the (average) retail price for receiving communications for consumers on the
rival networks. Unlike the previous case with inelastic consumer demand, here a networks
prots do not neatly decompose into prots from consumers and prots from web-sites.
Nevertheless, the o¤-net-cost pricing principle still holds, and equilibrium prices are given
by (49) above.68 Equilibrium prots are zero as before. However, unlike the inelastic case
where the level of the access charge had no e¤ect on welfare, here there is a welfare e¤ect.
Assuming everyone is served, welfare per web-site with the reception charge p is
v(p) + [p+ u^  cO   cT ]q(p) :
(Recall that a web-site gains utility u^ from each visit. Here v(p) is the consumer surplus
function associated with q(p), so that v0(p) =  q(p).) Maximizing this implies that the ideal
reception price is
p = cO + cT   u^ ,
67This insight implies that the market works just as if there are two kinds of network, one kind just caters
for consumers and one kind just caters for web-sites. There is one-way tra¢ c from the latter set of networks
to the former. Viewed from this perspective, this market is very similar to the model of mobile telephony in
the previous section, with call tra¢ c from the xed networks to the mobile networks. (The fact that mobile
networks also called the xed network played no role in the analysis, since the termination charge on the
xed networks, and hence the quantity of calls to the xed network, was exogenously xed.)
68For instance, if the rival networks o¤er a reception price p which is greater than the e¤ective marginal
cost cT   a, then it pays network i to undercut this price slightly and to take the entire population of
consumers.
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and so from (49) this implies that the optimal access charge that implements this outcome
is
a = u^  cO : (50)
This access charge also implements the origination charge p^ = u^, which means that web-site
providers are left with none of the gains from trade in equilibrium. This is to be expected:
Ramsey principles suggest that any service inelastically supplied should bear the burden
of price-cost markups. If the supply of web-sites was also elastic, then the optimal access
charge will have to trade-o¤ the e¢ ciency losses of both sides of the market.69 However, the
formula (50) does not necessarily imply that the access charge is high, or even positive: if
u^ is small, so that most of the benets of communication are on the consumer side, then
the access charge will be negative, i.e. the originating network is paid for supplying valuable
information to consumers.70
This brief discussion of some issues concerning access pricing between internet networks
is similar in some ways to the earlier analysis of the mobile telephony market. In particu-
lar, even though there is e¤ective competition for both consumers and web-site providers,
this does not justify a laissez-faire policy towards interconnection arrangements between net-
works. Perhaps the main di¤erence between the mobile model and the internet model is that
in the latter there are two bottlenecks: (i) once a consumer has signed up with a network,
that network has a monopoly over providing communication to that consumer (similar to
the case of mobile subscribers above), and (ii) once a web-site has signed up with a network,
that network has a monopoly for originating communication from that web-site.71
4 Two-way Access Pricing and Network Interconnec-
tion
In this section of the chapter we discuss the important topic of two-way network intercon-
nection. In contrast to the scenarios outlined in previous sections, here all rms in the
69See La¤ont, Marcus, Rey, and Tirole (2001) for this analysis, and also for several further extensions to
this basic model (including allowing for imperfect competition between networks, and for di¤erential charging
according to whether tra¢ c is on-netor o¤-net).
70As well as this Ramsey analysis, La¤ont, Marcus, Rey, and Tirole (2001) discuss how networks would
cooperatively choose the access charge a to maximize prots. (They extend this competitive model to allow
for imperfect competition.) They show that there is no reason to expect that networks will agree to charge
the socially optimal charge, and so there is some scope for regulatory intervention in this market.
71This latter e¤ect is also present in the mobile model once a subscriber has joined a particular mobile
network, that network must originate all calls from the subscriber but is unimportant when there is e¤ective
competition. The di¤erence is that in the mobile model people on the xed network were assumed not to
obtain any benet from being called by mobile subscribers and, more importantly, they were not charged
for receiving calls.
50
market must negotiate with each other to gain access to each others subscribers.72 Because
this analysis can quickly become complicated, we look rst at the case of xed, captive
subscriber bases, which is naturally illustrated by the case of international call termination.
In subsequent sections we allow these market shares to be determined endogenously by the
competitive process.
4.1 Fixed Subscriber Bases: International Call Termination
Consider two countries, A and B.73 Suppose that the cost of originating a call in country i
(to be terminated in the other country) is cOi and the cost of terminating a call in country
i (originating in the other country) is cTi . Let the total cost of making a call from i to j be
ci = c
O
i + c
T
j . The price of a call from country i to country j is pi. The demand for calls from
i to j is xi(pi).74 Let i be dened by i(pi) = (pi   ci)xi(pi), and this the prot function
in country i if call termination happens to be priced at marginal cost. Consumer surplus
in i is vi(pi), where v0i =  xi. (We assume that the prices in this international market do
not a¤ect the demand for other telecommunications services supplied in the two countries.)
Total (world) surplus due to the call tra¢ c between the countries is therefore
vA(pA) + A(pA) + vB(pB) + B(pB) ,
which is maximized by setting prices equal to the actual marginal costs: pi = ci: Let the call
termination charge in country i be ai. Then the prots of country i due to this international
market are
i = (pi   cOi   aj)xi(pi)| {z }
prots from call origination
+ (ai   cTi )xj(pj)| {z }
prots from call termination
: (51)
Assume that the move order is for termination charges ai to be chosen rst and then,
taking these as given, countries choose their retail prices pi non-cooperatively.75 Therefore,
72In fact the previous model of internet interconnection also had this feature, in that networks typically
would have both consumers and web-sites as customers, and so networks would need access to each others
consumers to deliver communications originating on their own networks. However, in that model originators
and recipients of communications were disjoint groups, and information ows were always in one direction.
This feature greatly simplies the analysis.
73See Carter and Wright (1994), Hakim and Lu (1993), Cave and Donnelly (1996), Yun, Choi, and Ahn
(1997), section 6 of La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), Box 5.1 in La¤ont and Tirole (2000), Domon and
Kazuharu (1999), and Wright (1999b) for more analysis of the economics of international settlements in
telecommunications. At a deeper level, this analysis is closely related to the problem of negotiating trade
tari¤s/subsidies between two large countries for instance, see Mayer (1981) for a classic treatment.
74For simplicity, assume there are no cross-price e¤ects for calls in the two directions. See Acton and
Vogelsang (1992) for evidence that cross-price e¤ects are not signicant.
75The reverse ordering (or assuming all prices are chosen simultaneously) does not make sense since if the
two retail prices are xed then the quantity of calls which country i must terminate, which is xj(pj), is also
xed. (we assume a country cannot refuse to terminate calls at the specied price.) Country i can then
set an arbitrarily high termination charge ai and make arbitrarily high prots, and no equilibrium can exist
with the alternative move order.
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given the pair of access charges (aA; aB), each country i chooses its retail price pi to maximise
its welfare, taking the others retail price as given.
Suppose rst that retail price regulation (or competition) in each country is such that,
given the foreign countrys termination charge, the call charge is equal to the perceived
marginal cost of the call:
pi = c
O
i + aj : (52)
(This is similar to Assumption 7 in section 3.1.2.) Clearly, if
ai = c
T
i for i = A;B (53)
then both countries will set the ideal prices pi = ci. Therefore, cost-based termination charges
induce the best outcome from the point of view of overall welfare, at least provided national
regulators act in the way described above. Given the one-to-one relationship between ai and
pj in (52) we can think of each country as choosing the other countrys retail price for calls.
Written in this way prots in (51) become
i = (pj   cj)xj(pj) = j(pj) :
(There are no prots from call origination.) Welfare in country i is therefore
wi = vi(pi) + j(pj) (54)
where country i chooses pj and country j chooses pi.
So far the analysis has been done assuming that regulation or competition in each country
forces the price of international calls to be equal to the perceived cost of making such calls.
International calls have historically been priced substantially above the associated costs
even taking into account the existing (high) international call termination payments and
so it is worthwhile to extend this analysis to allow for the possibility that countries might
wish to use prots from international calls for other, perhaps socially useful, purposes. One
way to model this is to suppose that country i receives benets of 1 + i > 1 for each unit
of prot it makes in the international sector, from both retail and call termination sources.
(The previous analysis assumed that i = 0.) In this case welfare in country i is given by
wi = vi(pi) + (1 + i)

(pi   cOi   aj)xi(pi) + (ai   cTi )xj(pj)
	
: (55)
Since prots are now more valuable, a country will wish to set its outbound price above its
perceived marginal cost. Indeed, maximizing the above expression with respect to pi given
aj implies that marginal cost pricing is replaced by the Ramsey formula
pi   cOi   aj
pi
=
i
1 + i
1
i
; (56)
where i is the elasticity of demand for calls from i to j. In this case we have pi > c
O
i + aj,
although there is still a one-to-one, increasing relationship between aj and pi: A country with
52
a higher social cost of public fundsparameter i and/or a less elastic demand for calls will
choose a higher price/cost markup for its international calls. If we write
i(aj) = max
pi
:

vi(pi) + (1 + i)(pi   cOi   aj)xi(pi)
	
to be the maximum welfare in country i due to outbound calls, then the envelope theorem
implies that
0i(aj) =  (1 + i)x^i(aj) (57)
where x^i(aj) is the optimal number of calls given the overseas countrys termination charge
aj. Here, x^i is decreasing in aj. Also, a higher value for i translates into a higher value for
(pi   cOi   aj)xi(pi), which in turn induces a smaller value for x^i.
4.1.1 Non-cooperative Determination of Termination Charges
Suppose now that each country chooses its termination charge or equivalently, the overseas
countrys retail price non-cooperatively. Given the pricing rule (52), country i knows that
if it chooses the overseas retail price pj it will make a prot from call termination equal to
j(pj). Since the choice of termination charge does not a¤ect its consumer surplus from origi-
nating calls (which is chosen by j), i will choose pj to maximize prots from call termination,
so that pj is chosen by i to satisfy the usual monopoly formula
pj   cj
pj
=
1
j
> 0 : (58)
This implies that ai > cTi .
76 Therefore, if countries choose their termination charges in-
dependently, each will set a charge above cost, with the result that world surplus is not
maximized. Each country exploits its monopoly position in call termination with the result
that, despite the rst-best pricing behaviour at the national level in (52), retail prices are
set as if networks were unregulated prot-maximizing monopolies in each direction. In par-
ticular, it is straightforward to see that each country will benet if both termination charges
are brought down at least a little from this non-cooperative equilibrium, since each country
su¤ers only a second-order loss in prots from call termination, but a rst-order gain in
the surplus from making calls.77 Thus we have the important insight that non-cooperative
setting of termination charges will cause the charges to be set at too high a level, due to the
standard double-marginalization problem.
76More generally, if the overseas country has demand x^j(ai) given the home countrys termination charge
as illustrated by the case of Ramsey pricing mentioned above then i will choose ai to maximize its call
termination prot (ai   cTi )x^j(ai).
77However, it is not true that it is in each countrys interest individually to reduce both termination
charges all the way down to cost. For instance, suppose one country has only a tiny demand for calls to the
other country, so that vi  0. This country will then lose out if both charges are brought down to cost.
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4.1.2 Cooperative Determination of Termination Charges
Given the ine¢ ciency of choosing termination charges non-cooperatively, it is natural and
desirable that countries negotiate their mutual termination charges. Here we consider three
kinds of negotiations with progressively less complex kinds of bargaining:
Bargaining with side-payments: If side-payments can costlessly be made between countries
(and if there is no asymmetric information about costs and demands), it is natural to suppose
that an e¢ cient outcome is attainable, and termination charges will be set equal to costs:
pi = ci and ai = cTi . How the rst-best surplus is divided between the countries will depend
on the details of the bargaining procedure.
Bargaining with non-reciprocal termination charges: Next, suppose that no such side-payments
are possible, and the two countries simply bargain over the pair of access charges (assuming
retail prices are then set as in (52)). Whatever the precise form the negotiations take, it is
reasonable to suppose bargaining is (second-best) e¢ cient in the sense that one countrys
welfare is maximized subject to the others welfare being held constant, i.e. retail prices pA
and pB must maximize wA subject to wB  wB for some reservation level wB. From (54)
the rst-order conditions for this problem are
0A(pA)
xA(pA)
=
xB(pB)
0B(pB)
or 
1  pA   cA
pA
A

1  pB   cB
pB
B

= 1 :
In particular, either pi = ci for both countries (which can be optimal only in knife-edge
situations, depending on wB) or one countrys call charge is above cost and the others is
below cost. Therefore, except in totally symmetric situations (when pi = ci and ai = cTi is
the outcome of any reasonable bargaining process), one country makes a loss on terminating
calls, and the other makes a prot.
Bargaining with reciprocal termination charges: Finally, suppose that countries must choose
symmetric termination charges, so that aA = aB = a, say. Given the pricing rule (52),
welfare in (54) with a reciprocal termination charge a is
wi = vi(c
O
i + a) + j(c
O
j + a) ;
and so country is ideal reciprocal termination charge, denoted ai , is given by the expression
ai = c
T
i +
xj(c
O
j + a

i )  xi(cOi + ai )
 x0i(cOj + ai )
: (59)
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Therefore, in symmetric situations where cTA = c
T
B, c
O
A = c
O
B and xA  xB the interests of
countries coincide, and each is happy to agree to charge for call termination at marginal cost.
In other cases, however, countries will have divergent interests. Given divergent preferences,
it is natural to suppose that the equilibrium reciprocal charge will lie between the two
privately preferred values, aA and a

B, and its precise location will depend on the balance of
bargaining powerbetween the two countries.
Expression (59) shows that a country would like to have a reciprocal termination charge
that is higher than its termination cost whenever (i) originating call costs are approximately
equal and the foreign country has higher demand for calls than the home country, or (ii)
demand functions are approximately equal and the foreign country has lower costs for origi-
nating calls than the home country. In sum, countries with either high costs or a net inow
of calls over the relevant range of prices will prefer a higher reciprocal termination charge.
In practice this means that poorer countries will, on the whole, prefer higher reciprocal
termination charges than will more developed countries.
More generally, when the countries have a social cost of public funds, welfare (55) in
country i with the reciprocal charge a is
wi = i(a) + (1 + i)(a  cTi )x^j(a) :
From (57), this is maximized by setting
ai = c
T
i +
x^j(a

i )  x^i(ai )
 x^0i(ai )
;
which generalizes (59) above. This shows that another factor which causes preferences to
diverge over termination charges is the social cost of public funds. As discussed above, in
otherwise symmetric environments, if j > i then x^j(a) < x^i(a) and so country i prefers
a lower reciprocal termination charge than country j. Since poorer countries will also tend
to have a higher social cost of public funds due, for instance, to fewer sources for e¤ective
taxation this will be yet another reason to expect that these countries will prefer higher
reciprocal termination charges.
4.2 Interconnection with Competition for Subscribers
In this section we extend the analysis to allow networks to compete for subscribers, rather
than taking market shares as exogenously xed. While some of the insights from the analysis
of international call termination continue to be valid in this competitive case for instance,
non-cooperative setting of termination charges will lead to ine¢ ciently high retail prices
others will not.
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4.2.1 A General Framework
Consider the following model: there are two networks, A and B, competing for the same
subscribers.78 Each subscriber purchases all telephony services from one network or the other
(or none). There is a continuum of potential subscribers, with total number normalized to 1.
Subscribers are di¤erentiated, and if they receive utilityuA from using network A and uB
from using network B, then network A has nA = sA(uA; uB) subscribers and network B has
nB = sB(uB; uA) subscribers. (These utilities will be derived below.) Naturally, si(ui; uj)
is increasing in ui and decreasing in uj; since a better deal being o¤ered by the rival causes
a networks subscriber numbers to fall. If nA + nB = 1, then all potential subscribers
join one or other network over the relevant range of utilities; otherwise there is only partial
participation, and network externalities become an important ingredient of the analysis.
An example of the market share function si is obtained from the familiar Hotelling model
of consumer choice. Suppose that the two rms are locatedat each end of the unit interval.
A consumers type (or location) is denoted y 2 [0; 1]: If the two rmsutilities are uA and uB,
then such a consumer gains utility of uA wy if she joins network A, and utility uB w(1 y)
if she joins network B. Here w > 0 is a parameter that determines how closely substitutable
are the two services. Suppose consumers types are uniformly distributed over the unit
interval. Then si is given by
ni = si(ui; uj) =
1
2
+
ui   uj
2w
(60)
(provided that 0  ni  1). This is an example where there is full subscriber participation,
so that nA + nB  1 over the relevant range of utilities.79
Depending on the context, networks could be using two-part pricing or linear pricing.80
To keep the analysis as general as possible at this stage, suppose rm i o¤ers its subscribers
the tari¤
Ti(x; x^) = pix+ p^ix^+ fi ; (61)
where x is the number of calls made to other subscribers on the same network i (on-net
calls), x^ is the number of calls made to subscribers on the rival network (o¤-net calls),
pi is the marginal price for on-net calls, p^i is the marginal price for o¤-net calls, and fi
78This basic model is adapted from Armstrong (1998), La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) and La¤ont, Rey,
and Tirole (1998b). The rst paper considered only linear retail prices, whereas the latter two analyzed
the more relevant case of two-part tari¤s as well. The last of these discussed the case where networks are
permitted to condition their call charges upon the destination network. See also the closely related work
of Carter and Wright (1999), who examine in more detail whether rms might not interconnect at all. See
Chapter 5 in La¤ont and Tirole (2000) for another overview of two-way network interconnection issues. The
competition in utility space approach used in this section is explored in more detail in Armstrong and
Vickers (2001).
79More generally, one can show that whenever there is full subscriber participation, subscriber decisions
depend only upon the di¤erence in utilities ui   uj .
80The case of fully nonlinear pricing is considered below in section 4.2.3.
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is the xed charge (which is zero if linear pricing is used). Public policy (or technological
limitations) may require that pi = p^i, so that networks cannot price discriminate according
to the destination network. We assume that subscribers do not pay for receiving calls.81
A subscriber is assumed to gain the same utility from calling every other subscriber, and
if a subscriber faces the price p for calling some other subscriber, the former will make x(p)
calls to the latter. This demand function is assumed to be independent of the identities of
the caller and recipient, and also of the network that each party has joined. (Later we will
allow callers to di¤er in their demand for calls and in how many calls they receive.) Let
v(p) be the level of consumer surplus associated with the demand function x(p), so that
v0   x. For now, suppose that subscribers obtain no utility from receiving calls this
assumption is relaxed in the next section. Then, given the subscription choices made by the
other subscribers, the utility received by a subscriber if she joins network i = A;B is
ui = niv(pi) + njv(p^i)  fi : (62)
Thus a subscribers utility is linear in the number of subscribers of each network, i.e. network
externalities take the same linear form as we used in the mobile telephony discussion in
section 3.1.3. Notice that even if there is full subscriber participation, so that nA + nB = 1,
whenever pi 6= p^i there are what La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) term tari¤ mediated
network externalitiespresent, and subscribers will choose their network partly on the basis
of the number of other subscribers on the network. The system of choices in (62) is consistent
provided that
nA = sA(uA; uB) ; nB = sB(uB; uA) :
Therefore, given the pair of tari¤s o¤ered by the rms, this system of four equations in four
unknowns will, at least in the cases we consider, yield the unique equilibrium subscriber
numbers. For instance, in the simple Hotelling model (60) one obtains82
nA = 1  nB =
mA   12w (fA   fB)
mA +mB
(63)
as the unique equilibrium, where
mi =
1
2
+
v(p^i)  v(pj)
2w
:
(Here we require that 0  nA  1.)
The net number of calls from network i to network j, which we denote by zi, is
zi  ninj(x(p^i)  x(p^j)) : (64)
81See Kim and Lim (2001), Hermalin and Katz (2001) and Jeon, La¤ont, and Tirole (2004) for analyses
of the case where networks can charge for incoming calls.
82See Section 3 of La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) for more details, including a discussion of the important
issue of whether this equilibrium is stable.
57
The function zi represents what might be considered the net demand for accessby network
i. Note that when networks choose the same call charges so that in particular p^i = p^j
then the net tra¢ c ow between the two networks is zero even if networks have di¤erent
subscriber numbers.
Turning to the cost side, just as in sections 3.1 and 4.1 above, let cOi be network is
cost of supplying a call which originates on its network and which is terminated on the rival
network (not including the termination charge), let cTi be network is cost of terminating a
call from the other network, and let the cost of originating and terminating a call entirely
within network i just be cOi + c
T
i . (Thus, there is no cost advantage in carrying a call over a
single network rather than over two.) Let ki be the xed cost of connecting any subscriber
to network i. Therefore, as in section 3.1, if a subscriber makes q calls and receives Q calls,
the total physical costs for network i are cTi Q+ c
O
i q + ki.
Let ai be the charge for terminating a call on network i. Therefore, given the two retail
tari¤s, the resulting market shares, and the two termination charges, total prots for network
i are
i = ni

pi   cOi   cTi

nix(pi) +

p^i   cOi   aj

njx(p^i) + fi   ki
	| {z }
prot from subscription
+ ninj(ai   cTi )x(p^j)| {z }
prot from termination
: (65)
Similarly to the function i in section 4.1, introduce the notation
i(pi)  (pi   cOi   cTi )x(pi)
for the prot function for on-net calls. Then we can rearrange (65) to give
i = ni fnii(pi) + nji(p^i) + fi   kig+ ninj

(ai   cTi )x(p^j)  (aj   cTi )x(p^i)
	
which, when termination charges are reciprocal (i.e. when aA = aB = a), simplies to
i = ni fnii(pi) + nji(p^i) + fi   kig   (a  cTi )zi : (66)
As in section 4.1, the move order is that access charges ai are chosen rst and then, taking
these as given, rms choose their retail tari¤s non-cooperatively.83
83A subtle point is that one has to take care about the choice of strategic variables for the rms when
network e¤ects are present. For instance, in (62) above there is a one-for-one relationship between utility
ui and the xed charge fi. Given fpi; p^ig two competitive scenarios are (i) rms o¤er utilities ui and then
choose fi ex post in order to deliver the promised utility (which would then depend on the market shares
achieved), and (ii) rms o¤er the xed charges fi, and consumers predict the equilibrium market shares and
choose their network accordingly. Unfortunately, the outcome is di¤erent in the two cases. When this is
an issue we will assume that competition takes the form (ii), so that rms compete in tari¤s rather than
utilities, since that is (perhaps) economically the more plausible.
58
4.2.2 The First-Best Outcome
Here we consider the benchmark case where the regulator can control the two rmsretail
tari¤s directly, and so we calculate the socially optimal two-part tari¤s, as in (61), for the
two rms. From (65), total industry prots with a given pair of retail tari¤s are
nA

pA   cOA   cTA

nAx(pA) +

p^A   cOA   cTB

nBx(p^A) + fA   kA
	
+nB

pB   cOB   cTB

nBx(pB) +

p^B   cOB   cTA

nAx(p^B) + fB   kB
	
:
Using the notation w(p; c)  x(p)(p  c)+ v(p) and cij = cOi + cTj for the cost a making a call
from network i to j, and substituting for fi in (62), this expression for total industry prots
can rewritten as
nA fnAw(pA; cAA) + nBw(p^A; cAB)  uA   kAg
+nB fnAw(p^B; cBA) + nBw(pB; cBB)  uB   kBg
Given the two utilities uA and uB o¤ered by the rms, let total subscriber surplus be
V (uA; uB). This function satises the usual envelope conditions
@
@uA
V (uA; uB) = sA(uA; uB) ;
@
@uB
V (uA; uB) = sB(uA; uB) :
Total welfare is therefore
W = V (uA; uB) + nA fnAw(pA; cAA) + nBw(p^A; cAB)  uA   kAg
+ nB fnAw(p^B; cBA) + nBw(pB; cBB)  uB   kBg :
Clearly, for any pair of utilities fuA; uBg, this expression is maximized by choosing each rms
call charges to maximize the relevant welfare function w(; cij), i.e., to equal the relevant
marginal cost:
pi = c
O
i + c
T
i ; p^i = c
O
i + c
T
j : (67)
In particular, when termination costs di¤er on the two networks, we see that price discrimi-
nation according to the destination network is socially optimal.
With the prices in (67) total welfare becomes
W = V (uA; uB) + nA fnAv(cAA) + nBv(cAB)  uA   kAg
+ nB fnAv(cBA) + nBv(cBB)  uB   kBg :
Maximizing the above with respect to ui, and making the substitution in (62), one obtains
the following expressions for the optimal xed charges:84
fA = kA   nAv(cAA)  nBv(cBA) ; fA = kA   nAv(cAB)  nBv(cBB) : (68)
84Since there is no strategic interaction between the rms in this welfare analysis, the issue mentioned in
footnote 84 does not arise, and maximizing welfare with respect to xed charges and with respect to utilities
yields the same result.
59
(Of course, the subscriber numbers nA and nB are endogenous in the above, and are deter-
mined jointly with fA and fB.)
In sum, (67) shows that call charges should equal the relevant marginal costs, while (68)
shows that the xed charge should be subsidized below the xed cost to reect the externality
that a subscribers choice of network exerts on other callers. (If a subscriber chooses to join
network A, say, then each of As other subscribers obtains benet v(cAA) and each of Bs
subscribers obtains benet v(cBA), which therefore yields the required subsidy in (68).) In
particular, we see that except in a special case discussed below it is not optimal to have
marginal cost pricing for all services, and the charge for joining a network should di¤er from
cost in order, roughly speaking, to attract more subscribers onto the network with the lower
termination cost.
The formula (68) is valid for all network choice functions si(uA; uB), and in general this
rst-best policy calls for subsidies to be provided out of public funds. However, in the
important special case where total subscriber numbers are xed, so that nA + nB  1,
then policy is simplied. In particular, since all subscribers opt to join one or other network,
market shares depend only on the di¤erence in utilities. Therefore, adding a constant amount
to both networksxed charge in (68) will not a¤ect subscriber decisions, or total welfare,
and so the rst best can be achieved without recourse to subsidies.
This special case of full participation also makes clear that it is the di¤erence in the rms
termination, rather than origination or xed, costs that is the motive for the distortion
in (68). For instance, suppose that the rms have the same termination cost, and so in
particular that ciA  ciB. Then the rst-best is achieved by pricing all services, including
the xed charge of joining a network, at marginal cost. In particular, in the symmetric case
when the two rms have the same costs which is the focus of the next section the optimal
outcome is indeed implemented by marginal-cost pricing. The reason for this is that, when
call charges are given by (67), di¤erences in origination costs are fully internalized by
subscribers at the time they choose their network.
By contrast, when rms di¤er only in their termination costs, then with a marginal-cost
pricing regime, subscribers do not fully take into account the implications of their network
choice on their callers. (This situation is somewhat related to the model of the mobile market
in section 3.1 above.) To correct for this, the optimal xed charge/xed cost margin is lower
on the network with the lower termination cost, as in (68).
A natural question to ask is whether this rst-best outcome can be implemented by means
of a suitable choice of termination charges, and then leaving the two networks to compete at
the retail level. Unfortunately, the answer to this, except in a few special cases, is No. (In
the next section, where the focus is on symmetric situations, we will see that the rst-best
can often be implemented when the termination charge is equal to cost.) The reason is that
the access charges are being call upon to perform too many tasks. The rst best involves the
correct choice of six variables (the two pairs of call charges for the two rms together with the
two xed charges), and yet we have only two instruments (the pair of termination charges)
at our disposal. In fact, under a cost-based termination charge regime, where ai  cTi , then
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the four call charges will be at the rst-best level, given in (67), in equilibrium. However,
there is no reason to believe that the xed charges that emerge from competition will be
equal to (68).
No price discrimination: The above analysis assumed that rms used the most general tari¤s
as in (61). Since this form of price discrimination involving di¤erent call charges for on-net
and o¤-net calls is not common at present, it is worthwhile to perform this welfare analysis
under the assumption that rms must charge the same for all calls (i.e., that pi  p^i). For
simplicity, suppose that there is full subscriber participation, so that nA + nB  1. Then
one can show that (67) becomes
pA = nAcAA + nBcAB ; pB = nAcBA + nBcBB :
Therefore, the call charge on network i is set equal to the average marginal cost as weighted
by market shares, so that pi = nAciA+nBciB. And, corresponding to (68), when call charges
must be uniform we see that the optimal pattern of xed charge/xed cost markups is given
by
(fA   kA)  (fB   kB) = nAxA [cAA   cAB] + nBxB[cBA   cBB]
= [nAxA + nBxB][c
T
A   cTB] (69)
where we have written xi = x(nAciA + nBciB) for the equilibrium number of calls made by
a subscriber on network i.
If the right-hand side of (69) is negative, then subscriber access to network A is subsidized
relative to network B. Clearly, this is optimal if and only if call termination on network A
is lower than on B. The intuition for this is precisely the same as for the previous case in
(68) where networks o¤ered more exible tari¤s: with marginal cost pricing, subscribers do
not adequately take account of the e¤ect their choice of network has on their callerscall
charges. Therefore, incentives to join a network are distorted away from marginal costs in
order to induce more people to join the network with the lower termination cost, as shown
in (69).
4.2.3 Symmetric Competition: A Danger of Collusion?
Can networks that compete for subscribers be relied upon to choose termination charges that
are close to socially optimal? Or can networks use the choice of termination charges to a¤ect
their equilibrium behaviour in the retail market to boost prots at the expense of welfare?
We will see in the following succession of models that the answers to these questions are
rather subtle, and depend (i) on whether networks use linear rather than nonlinear tari¤s
and (ii) on whether they price discriminate between on-net and o¤-net calls.
In this section we suppose that the two networks are symmetric in terms of cost, so that
cOA = c
O
B = c
O, cTA = c
T
B = c
T and kA = kB = k. Write
(p)  x(p)(p  cO   cT ) (70)
61
for the on-net prot function for each network. We also use the (symmetric) Hotelling
formulation for subscriber choices as in (60). Because of symmetry we assume that networks
agree to charge a reciprocal access charge a to each other.85
Linear non-discriminatory pricing: Here, despite its lack of realism, suppose that the net-
works are constrained to o¤er only linear tari¤s, so that fi = 0. We also suppose that
networks are prohibited from engaging in price discrimination according to the destination
network, so that pi  p^i. In this case, since the total number of subscribers is always equal
to 1, (66) simplies to
i = ni f(pi)  kg   (a  cT )zi : (71)
Since total industry prots are (pA)+(pB), the joint-prot maximizing (or collusive) linear
retail price, denoted p, is the price that maximizes  in (70).
Consider the sub-game in which rms choose retail tari¤s given that a reciprocal access
charge a has initially been chosen. From (71), the rst-order condition for p to be the
equilibrium choice for each rm is that @i(p; p)=@pi = 0. With the Hotelling specication
(60), this entails
 x(p)
2w
((p)  k) + 1
2
0(p)  1
4
(a  cT )x0(p) = 0 : (72)
Since joint prots are maximized at p = p, where 0(p) = 0, if collusion can be sustained
by choosing a suitable access charge, say a, from (72) this access charge must be
a = cT +
x(p)
 x0(p)
2
w
((p)  k) > cT : (73)
In particular, we see that a > cT . This candidate for the collusive termination charge is high
when (i) 1
w
, which is a measure of the substitutability of the two networksservices, is high,
(ii) when demand is inelastic, i.e. when  x=x0 is high, or (iii) when (p) k, the maximum
prot per subscriber, is high. Note that in the limit as w becomes very large, so that market
shares are xed, the collusive termination charge is equal to cost. This is an instance of the
result in section 4.1 that in symmetric situations the ideal reciprocal termination is equal to
cost see (59) above.
When the access charge is set according to the rule (73), rms have no local incentive
to deviate from the collusive price p in the retail market, even though retail prices are set
non-cooperatively: if one rms undercuts the other by a small amount, the gain in retail
prots from increased market share is just o¤set by the increased access payments needed
for the increased number of calls made to the rival network.
85It is intuitive that if networks set access charges non-cooperatively, they will set them higher than if
they negotiate over a common charge, since there will be a serious double marginalizationproblem. This
is exactly comparable to the case of international call termination discussed in section 4.1.1 above. See also
La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) for more details. It will therefore be socially desirable to allow rms to
colludeover the choice of the access charge compared to the case where each rm acts independently.
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The remaining question is when the rst-order condition (72) does in fact characterize
the (globally) optimal response for one rm given that the other has chosen p. It is easy
to see that services being close substitutes will make this collusion impossible. From (60), if
one network deviates and chooses the price pL < p, it can take the whole market provided
that v(pL)  v(p) +w. Suppose also that this price pL is fairly close to p in the sense that
(pL) >
1
2
(p). If such a price may be found and clearly this is possible if w is su¢ ciently
small then the collusive price p cannot be sustained in equilibrium with any access charge,
for it would always pay a rm to corner the market by choosing the price pL (which thereby
eliminates the need for access payments altogether).86 On the other hand, if products are
not close substitutes then the sacrice in retail prots needed to come close to capturing all
subscribers is too great and no undercutting of the collusive price p is unilaterally protable.
Therefore, if the services o¤ered by the two networks are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, setting
a high termination charge may indeed be used as an instrument of collusion. The reason for
this is that high termination charges increase the cost of reducing retail prices unilaterally,
since such an action causes the deviating network to have a net outow of calls to the rival
network, which then results in costly call termination payments. In sum, a major contrast
between the one-way and two-way models of access pricing is that in the former the chief
danger is that high access charges can be used as an instrument of foreclosure perhaps
to drive out or otherwise disadvantage rivals in the downstream market whereas in the
latter case high access charges can sometimes be used as an instrument of collusion.87 An
implication is that rms should not be free to set their termination charges, even in the case
where there is no dispute between rms.
In fact this result is not really surprising. It is very plausible that di¤erent termination
charges will a¤ect the choice of retail tari¤s o¤ered by competing networks in equilibrium.
For instance, when price discrimination is banned so that p^i = pi the choice of a directly
a¤ects the average cost of a call, and this will naturally feed through into a higher equilibrium
call charge. What is more surprising is that this result that access charges can implement
collusion is easily overturned in natural extensions to this model, as will be seen in the
next sections.
Two-part tari¤s without network-based price discrimination: Next consider the more realistic
86More precisely, if a departs signicantly from termination cost then equilibrium in the retail market
simply does not exist when the market is su¢ ciently competitive see La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) and
La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) for several instances of this kind of problem. An interesting feature of the
recent analysis in La¤ont, Marcus, Rey, and Tirole (2001), which was discussed in section 3.2 above, and
Jeon, La¤ont, and Tirole (2004) is that, even in perfectly competitive markets, equilibrium exists when the
access charge departs from cost. In these two latter papers networks charge for receiving calls, whereas in
the earlier papers this price was missing. Introducing this price makes competition more stable see the
discussion in section 2 of La¤ont, Marcus, Rey, and Tirole (2001) for details.
87This kind of analysis can also be applied to the pay-TV market see section 2 of Armstrong (1999) for
a model in which two TV companies agree to pay each other large amounts for each others programmes in
order to weaken competition for subscribers.
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case where networks compete using two-part tari¤s. (We maintain the assumption that price
discrimination according to destination network is banned.) We will show that the collusive
impact of the access charge is now eliminated, at least in the simple symmetric and full-
participation model we are using. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that whenever a
symmetric retail equilibrium exists, the resulting prots cannot depend at all on the choice
of termination charge.
With a given reciprocal termination charge a, network is prot in (71) is modied to be
i = ni f(pi) + fi   kg   (a  cT )zi : (74)
Suppose that the symmetric retail equilibrium involves each network o¤ering the two-part
tari¤ T (x) = px+ f , in which case the equilibrium subscriber utility is uA = uB = v(p)  f .
Consider what happens if one rm decides to vary its xed charge f a little, keeping the call
charge constant at p. (Clearly at any equilibrium, a rm should have no incentive to deviate
from f .) Because each network o¤ers the same call charge p, the net demand for access zi
in (64) is zero, even when rms have di¤erent market shares. Therefore, rms can compete
for market share by reducing f without incurring call termination payments, and this is
the major di¤erence with the linear pricing case.
It is now straightforward to derive equilibrium prots. With the market share speci-
cation (60), when a rm o¤ers the xed charge f^ rather than the equilibrium charge f , its
total prot in (74) is  
1
2
+
f   f^
2w
!
(p) + f^   k

:
For f to be an equilibrium this expression must be maximized at f^ = f , and so we obtain
the rst-order condition
(p) + f   k  w : (75)
Since the left-hand side of this expression is the total industry prots (which is split equally
between the two networks), we see that the choice of termination charge a has no e¤ect
on prots. In particular, a cannot be used as a collusive device when non-discriminatory
two-part tari¤s are used.
The choice of a does a¤ect the equilibrium choice of the price p, however. Indeed,
Proposition 7 in La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) shows (using the current notation) that
the equilibrium call charge is
p = cO +
1
2
(cT + a) ; (76)
which is just the perceived average cost of a call when networks divide the market equally.88
Therefore, just as in the above linear pricing case, a high access charge feeds through into
a high retail call charge, and hence leads to high protability from calls. However, the
88This proposition also shows that equilibrium exists when w is not too small or a  cT is not too large.
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additional instrument of the xed charge is then used to attract these protable subscribers,
with the result that these excess prots are partially competed away.89 Clearly, in this
model the socially optimal retail price is p = cO + cT , and so the socially optimal access
charge is equal to cost: a = cT . Since the rms are indi¤erent between termination charges
when two-part tari¤s are used, in theory they will not object to a regulatory suggestion to
set a = cT . In this sense, then, competition for subscribers greatly simplies the regulatory
problem when two-part tari¤ are used.
Two-part tari¤s with call externalities: To see how robust the above prot-neutrality
result is, consider the following extension. Suppose that each subscriber obtains utility b for
each call received. As above, networks charge a two-part tari¤ without price discrimination
according to destination network. In this case subscriber utility in (62) is modied to
ui = v(pi)  fi + b [nix(pi) + njx(pj)] :
Here, the term in [] is the total number of calls received by a subscriber, and this is inde-
pendent of the chosen network. Thus, a subscribers utility from receiving calls, which does
in general depend on the market shares of the two networks, does not bias a subscribers
network choice at all.90 Since with the Hotelling specication in (60) market shares depend
only on the di¤erence in o¤ered utility levels, the presence of call externalities has no e¤ect
on the competitive outcome. In particular, the equilibrium prots and retail tari¤s are still
given by (75) and (76), and are not a¤ected by the externality parameter b.
What is a¤ected, however, is the socially optimal termination charge. With the call
externality b, the socially optimal call charge is reduced to p = cO + cT   b in order to
stimulate call volume. From (76) this implies that the socially optimal termination charge
is below cost:91
a = cT   2b :
Again, though, the fact that prots are una¤ected by the termination charge suggests that
rms should not object to this regulatory requirement to subsidize network interconnection.92
89This e¤ect is similar to that seen in the analysis of the mobile market in section 3.1. There, networks
make large prots from terminating calls which are then (fully) competed away at the retail level.
90In the analysis by Jeon, La¤ont, and Tirole (2004) of call externalities and the e¤ects of charging for
incoming calls, this feature of the market plays a central role. Call externalities represent a direct externality,
whereas charging for incoming calls creates a pecuniary externality. In most cases, those authors show that
only the latter are relevant for rmsand subscribersincentives.
91Comparing this reduction to that in the mobile sector see expression (46) we see that the subsidy is
required to be twice as great. The reason for this is that, in the current context, it is required that a networks
perceived (average) marginal cost for a call be reduced by b. However, since only half of a networks calls are
destined for the rival network and so only half incur the cost a the reduction in a must be correspondingly
amplied.
92When the analysis is extended to allow for charging for incoming calls, as in Jeon, La¤ont, and Tirole
(2004), then there are two available instruments for implementing the desired call charge. For instance, one
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Nonlinear pricing with heterogeneous subscribers:93 Another important extension to the
basic analysis is to introduce more di¤erences in subscribers. The analysis until now has
homogeneity in the calling patterns of subscribers. In particular (i) all subscribers made
the same number of calls and (ii) all subscribers received the same number of calls. In this
section we extend the analysis to allow for subscriber heterogeneity. Again, though, we do
not permit networks to discriminate according to the destination network. For simplicity,
we return to the case where subscribers do not care about receiving calls (i.e. b = 0).
Specically, subscribers can di¤er in their demand for calls, and a high (respectively
low) demand type of subscriber is denoted by H (L). The fraction of subscribers with high
demand is . It is possible that high demand subscribers also di¤er in the number of calls
they receive, and suppose that a fraction k of the calls made by type k subscribers are
made to type H subscribers, and the fraction 1  k of their calls are made to low demand
consumers. (If k   then we would have a model where subscribers were equally likely
to call each other subscriber, regardless of the demand characteristics of the call recipient.)
Because of this heterogeneity, networks will choose to o¤er a pair of contracts, one for each of
the two kinds of subscriber. Without loss of generality, these contracts specify a total number
of calls X in return for a charge f . Suppose that network i o¤ers the type k subscriber a
contract allowing Xki calls in return for a charge f
k
i . We assume that in equilibrium both
demand types of subscriber are served, so that we do not have to consider network externality
e¤ects.94
We suppose that network choices continue to be made according to the Hotelling model,
i.e. that if uki is the maximum utility that a type k subscriber can obtain from the contracts
o¤ered by network i, then the fraction of type k subscribers who subscribe to network i
is given in (60). (Implicitly, we are assuming that the verticaldi¤erentiation parameter
k = L;H is uncorrelated with the horizontal, or brand preference, parameter y. There-
fore, knowledge of brand preference tells a rm nothing about a subscribers likely demand
for calls.) It actually makes no di¤erence to the following argument whether or not networks
can observe the demand type of any given subscriber.95 However, if a subscribers demand
characteristics are private information then networks must ensure that the incentive con-
straints are satised, and that a type k subscriber nds it privately optimal to choose the
contract (Xki ; f
k
i ) instead of the contract aimed at the other demand type.
could have call termination at cost, and impose a suitable incoming call charge. When, however, there is
the possibility that some subscribers will refuse to accept incoming calls rather than pay the incoming call
charge, then it is superior not to charge for incoming calls.
93This is adapted from Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004). See also section 3.5 of Tirole (1988) for an
account of the approach to nonlinear pricing used here.
94See Poletti and Wright (2003) for analysis of the case where participation constraints have an impact on
networkspolicies. They show that the prot neutrality result fails in this case.
95Or, in the terminology often used in the literature, it makes no di¤erence whether the model is one of
third degree or second degree price discrimination.
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If network i has a fraction nki of the demand type k subscribers, the total number of calls
received by a type H subscriber (on any network) from callers on network j can be shown
to be
nHj 
HXHj +
1  

nLj 
LXLj ;
while the number received by a type L subscriber (on any network) from callers on network
j is

1  n
H
j (1  H)XHj + nLj (1  L)XLj :
The number of calls made to network j by a type k subscriber on network i is
Xki

nHj 
k + nLj (1  k)

:
Therefore, with these call volumes and market shares, network is net outow of calls i.e.
its demand for access zi is given by the complex expression
zi = n
H
i X
H
i

nHj 
H + nLj (1  H)

+ (1  )nLi XLi

nHj 
L + nLj (1  L)

 (1  )nLi


1  n
H
j (1  H)XHj + nLj (1  L)XLj

:
 (1  )nLi


1  n
H
j (1  H)XHj + nLj (1  L)XLj

: (77)
If the reciprocal call termination charge is a, then, similarly to (66), network is prot is
i = n
H
i

fHi   k  XHi (cO + cT )

+ (1  )nLi

fLi   k  XLi (cO + cT )
  (a  cT )zi
where zi is as in (77).
Notice that when XkA = X
k
B = X
k say, so that the two networks each o¤er the same pair
of quantities in their contracts, the expression for zi in (77) simplies to
zi = (n
H
i n
L
j   nLi nHj )[XH(1  H)  (1  )XLL] : (78)
In particular, when we also have nLi = n
H
i , so that network i does not attract a dispropor-
tionate number of one demand type of subscriber, then zi = 0.
Next consider equilibrium prots for a given reciprocal access charge a. Given the symme-
try between networks, suppose that each network o¤ers the same pair of contracts f(XL; fL);
(XH ; fH)g in equilibrium. Suppose that network i deviates from this candidate equilibrium
by adding an amount " to both xed charges fL and fH . (In the case where the subscriber
demand type k is private information, this uniform change to the xed charges has no e¤ect
on the relative merits of the two contracts, and so does not a¤ect incentive compatibil-
ity.) Since we assume that competition causes the participation constraints not to bind for
subscribers, this modication does not drive any subscribers from the market, although it
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obviously drives marginal subscribers from one network to the other. From (60) this mod-
ication means that the network loses an equal proportion of both types of subscriber.96
In particular, from (78) we see that zi = 0 and the deviating rm incurs no access decit.
Similarly to (63), then, prots with this deviation are
i = 

1
2
  "
2w

fH + "  k  XH(cO + cT )
+ (1  )

1
2
  "
2w

fL + "  k  XL(cO + cT ) :
For the pair of contracts f(XL; fL); (XH ; fH)g to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that this
expression be maximized at " = 0, which just as in (75), yields the rst-order condition


fH   k  XH(cO + cT )+ (1  ) fL   k  XL(cO + cT ) = w :
The left-hand side of this expression is just the total prots in the market, which is equal to
the product di¤erentiation parameter w. Therefore, equilibrium prots again are una¤ected
by the level of the termination charge a. Thus we see that the prot-neutrality result is not
an artifact of the assumption that subscribers were homogeneous.
As in the case of two-part tari¤s, the choice of a does a¤ect the choice of contracts
o¤ered, and f(XH ; fH); (XL; fL)g will be a complicated function of the termination charge.
The socially optimal choice for a will therefore be the choice that implements the best pattern
of consumption. In the case where a = cT , it is possible to show that rms in equilibrium
will simply o¤er the cost-based two-part tari¤ T (x) = (cO + cT )x + w + k, so that calls are
charged at (actual and perceived) cost, and the rms make a prot of w per subscriber (just
as in the previous section on two-part tari¤s).97 Therefore, as before the socially optimal
access charge is a = cT , and since rms are indi¤erent between all levels of the access charge,
in principle they will not object to this regulatory policy.
This analysis of two-part tari¤s and nonlinear pricing seems to suggest that the choice of
termination charge cannot a¤ect prots at all, and networks will not object to a regulatory
suggestion to price interconnection at cost (or below cost in the case of call externalities).
However, it is important to stress that this convenient result is non-robust in a number
of dimensions. For instance the assumed cost and demand symmetry across networks
plays an important role in the argument. (Without this it is unlikely that networks will
choose reciprocal access charges.) Another reason for non-neutrality is explored in the next
section.98
96Dessein (2003) looks at the case where di¤erent subscriber types also have di¤erent transport cost
parameters w. For instance, high demand subscribers might be more price sensitive. In this case the
argument fails, and the access charge has an e¤ect on prots.
97See Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Dessein (2003) for further details.
98A further framework in which the prot-neutrality result is unlikely to hold is when there is only partial
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Two-part tari¤s with network-based price discrimination: Here we return to the homogeneous
subscriber framework, but now allow networks to make their call charges depend on the
destination network, i.e. to set pi 6= p^i. Although this problem looks rather complex, the
analysis is simplied by the following observation: in equilibrium all call charges are equal
to perceived marginal costs, so that
pA = pB = c
O + cT ; p^A = p^B = c
O + a : (79)
(The reasoning for this is the same as that used to derive (67).)
Armed with this observation, expressions (63) and (65) simplify to
ni =
1
2
+
1
2
fj   fi
w + v(cO + a)  v(cO + cT )
and
i = ni(fi   k) + ninj(a  cT )x(cO + a) :
Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium choice of fA = fB = f is given by f = k+w+ v(cO +
a)  v(cO + cT ).99 The resulting total industry prots are then
 = w + v(cO + a)  v(cO + cT ) + 1
2
(a  cT )x(cO + a) : (80)
Clearly, this prot does now depend on a, and so the prot-neutrality result does not hold
when this form of price discrimination is permitted.
When a = cT we obtain the same prot w as in (75) for the no-discrimination case
analyzed above. (In this case rms do not choose to practice price discrimination, even
if they are permitted to do so.) However, networks can do better than this when price
discrimination is allowed. For prot in (80) is maximized by choosing the termination charge
a = cT   x x0 < c
T ;
and so prots are at their maximum if call termination is subsidized.100
subscriber participation in the market, i.e. when the total number of subscribers rises as the available
consumer surplus increases. (This feature was discussed in section 3.1.3 on the mobile sector.) In this case
there will be a market expansione¤ect as well as a business stealinge¤ect of the choice of access charge,
and the former will most likely make equilibrium prots depend on the access charge. The analysis of this
case appears to be somewhat technical, and for some preliminary results see Dessein (2003).
99We are ignoring the details about when such an equilibrium exists see Proposition 5 in La¤ont, Rey,
and Tirole (1998b) for a discussion of this.
100There is an error in the proof of Proposition 5 in La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) which led those
authors to conclude that choosing a = cT maximized prots. This has been corrected in Gans and King
(2001). The latter paper argues that the bill and keep system for network interconnection where each
network delivers the others tra¢ c for free might be a reasonable approximation to this prot-maximizing
termination charge (especially if tra¢ c monitoring costs are taken into account).
The analysis presented here assumes that rms used the xed charge fi as the strategic variable see
footnote 84 above. Intriguingly, if rms instead used utilities ui as their strategic variable, then one can
show that setting a = cT becomes the prot-maximizing choice.
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Clearly, social welfare is maximized in this model by setting a = cT , and so there is
once again a role for network access regulation in this market.101 Thus, in direct contrast
to the linear pricing case discussed above, where high access charges were used to bolster
prots at the expense of welfare, here low access charges are privately desirable but socially
costly. The intuition for this perhaps surprising result is that when a < cT it is cheaper for
subscribers to call people on the rival network than people on their own network, and so, all
else equal, subscribers prefer to belong to the smaller network. (Recall that, regardless of
market shares, each network sets the same pair of call charges given by (79).) This means
that the market exhibits negative network externalities, and rms have little incentive to
compete aggressively for subscribers. In e¤ect, by means of a suitable choice of termination
charge rms can coordinate on whether to have a market with positive network externalities
(high a), no network externalities (a = cT ) or negative network externalities (low a). Because
of its softening e¤ect on competition, it is mutually protable for rms to choose the third
option.102
Discussion: We have seen that the relationship between access charges and equilibrium
prots and in particular whether access charges can be used to sustain collusion
depends, in part, on the kinds of tari¤s the rms are able to o¤er. One way to get an
intuition about this is to use the framework of instruments and objectivesin section 2.2.3:
when do the rms have enough instruments to attain a given (perhaps collusive) outcome?
Since our analysis has assumed the use of only a single instrument the reciprocal access
charge a rms are likely to be able to sustain a given retail equilibrium only in the case of
linear pricing. With linear pricing there is only one objective the maximization of equi-
librium prots within the (restrictive) class of outcomes possible with linear tari¤s and
this single instrument will often be enough to implement the optimum. (However, we saw
that sometimes equilibrium did not exist for a wide enough range of access charges for this
argument to work.)
Other kinds of tari¤s, such as two-part tari¤s, have at least two dimensions to their
denition, and so the single instrument of the access charge will not in general be su¢ cient
to induce a given retail equilibrium. In particular, the joint-prot-maximizing two-part
tari¤ will not in general be sustainable by a particular choice for a.103 However, it is one
101Alternatively, public policy could prohibit this kind of price discrimination, which acts to restore the
prot neutrality result, thereby making the regulatory task easier.
102La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) also discuss the case of linear pricing with price discrimination. Propo-
sition 2 in that paper shows that when price discrimination is allowed and w is quite large, networks will
choose to set the termination charge above cost. Also, Proposition 3 shows that when w is large allowing
price discrimination is good for welfare (keeping the termination charge xed).
103If rms did have another instrument at their disposal, then, at least in some circumstances, we would
expect collusion to be possible when two-part tari¤s are used. For instance, if rms signed a reciprocal
agreement so that, say, rm A paid rm B a specied amount for each subscriber A served, then this would
be a means of controlling the xed charge element of the equilibrium two-part tari¤. (The access charge then
is left to control the usage charge in the usual way.) In a sense, this additional instrument performs a similar
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thing to note that the access charge will not be able to sustain the maximum prot, and
quite another to obtain the result that the access charge has no e¤ect on equilibrium prots.
This striking prot neutrality result was obtained for the case of both two-part tari¤s, both
with and without call externalities, and for fully nonlinear pricing. (However, it did not hold
for the case of network-based price discrimination). Although there has been little work
done, so far, outside the frameworks discussed in this section, one might conjecture that
this neutrality result is very special, and will depend, for instance, on the specic Hotelling
subscriber choice rule we used (involving full subscriber participation). If so, then there will
remain a role for regulation of the termination charge.
4.2.4 Asymmetric Competition and Non-Reciprocal Access Charges
The previous section analyzed symmetric competition between networks, and so might be
relevant to situations where competition is well-established and mature. In earlier stages
of market liberalization, however, competition if left to itself is likely to be skewed in favour
of the incumbent, and the analysis needs to be extended to cover such, often more relevant,
situations. Unfortunately, there have been only few contributions to the theory of asym-
metric competition between networks, so the following discussion is more speculative and
incomplete.
Perhaps the central reason why a proper analysis of asymmetric markets is so hard is
that there is no reason a priori to suppose that access charges should either from the rms
point of view or in terms of overall welfare be set reciprocally.104 Even if the two networks
termination costs (or other costs) were assumed to be the same itself a questionable as-
sumption if one rm is established and the other is an entrant this assumption of reciprocity
is not innocuous. For instance, in the model with a regulated incumbent rm described
below the regulator does not want generally to choose termination charges reciprocally, even
when termination costs are the same for the two networks. The discussion of international
call termination in section 4.1.2 was also in the context of asymmetric networks, but that
framework is a good deal more straightforward than this case where rms compete for sub-
scribers. However, even in that simple framework we saw that the outcome depended on the
details of the bargaining process generating the equilibrium. The advantage of symmetry
in section 4.2.3 is that the rms interests coincide at the stage where access charges are
determined, and so this bargaining stage is trivial. In asymmetric situations the details of
the procedure for choosing access charges will be more important. One of the most valuable
role to the output taxinstrument discussed in section 2. However, there are a number of reasons ranging
from di¢ culties involved in monitoring subscriber numbers, to competition law why such contracts may
not be possible.
Another possible instrument is a charge for incoming calls. When this is used, Jeon, La¤ont, and Tirole
(2004) show that it is sometimes possible for networks to obtain the joint prot-maximizing outcome with a
suitable choice of termination charge and reception charge.
104Another reason why the asymmetric analysis is not transparent is that marginal cost pricing is then
generally not the rst-best outcome see section 4.2.2 above.
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areas for future research will be to nd compelling theoretical models of how non-reciprocal
access charges are determined: ideally tractable models can be found; if not, then numerical
simulations seem likely to be most promising way forward.105
In the remains of this section we briey discuss two related models.106 The rst is a
model where the two networks choose their retail tari¤s without regulatory control, and the
second is a model where the dominant rms retail tari¤ is controlled.
A simple model of asymmetric competition and non-reciprocal termination charges: The
crucial simplication that we make here, and in the next model, in order to make the analysis
tractable is to suppose that subscribers have inelastic demand for calls.107 Specically,
suppose that, regardless of the price per call, each subscriber wishes to make exactly one
unit of calls to each other subscriber. (We also assume there is full subscriber participation,
so that nA + nB  1.) In this case, all that matters for a subscribers network decision is
the total charge a network levies for making a single unit of calls to all other subscribers.108
Suppose, then, that this combined charge is Pi on network i. If u is some (high) gross utility
a subscriber receives from making his calls, then the utility received by a subscriber if she
joins network i = A;B in (62) becomes
ui = u  Pi : (81)
Let ai be the charge for terminating a call on network i. Therefore, total prots for
network i are simplied from (65) to become
i = ni

Pi  

cOi + c
T
i

ni  

cOi + aj

nj   ki
	| {z }
prot from subscription
+ ninj(ai   cTi )| {z }
prot from termination
: (82)
Introducing the notation
Ci  cOi + cTi + ki ;
105For some preliminary work in this direction using a dynamic model of network entry, see de Bijl and
Peitz (2002) and de Bijl and Peitz (2001).
106Other treatments of asymmetric competition are section 7 in La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) and section
6 in La¤ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b), although the focus there is mainly on the case of reciprocal access
pricing. The source of the asymmetry there is the fact that the incumbent has full geographic coverage,
whereas the entrant has to install coverage (with a convex cost in so doing). Carter and Wright (2003)
present a model of vertical di¤erentiation, in which the incumbent o¤ers a superior service to the entrant.
(The cost functions of the two rms do not di¤er.) Again, though, the analysis focuses on reciprocal access
charges. They nd that the largerrm would like the reciprocal access charge to be equal to the rms
termination cost. Moreover, they show that when the market is very asymmetric, the smaller rm would
also like the access charge to be set equal to cost.
107This section has particularly benetted from comments from Julian Wright.
108In fact, this is not quite true. If rms charged di¤erently for on-net and o¤-net calls, then subscribers
would have to come to a view about the equilibrium market shares before they can choose their network.
Similarly to the discussion in footnote 84 above, this would a¤ect the equilibrium. For simplicity, we side-
step this issue and assume that rms compete in total chargesPi which are invariant to the realized market
shares.
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and using the assumption that nA + nB  1, implies that we can rearrange (82) to give
i = ni fPi   Cig+ ninj fai   ajg : (83)
In particular, the outcomes (prices, prots, market shares, welfare) depend only on the
di¤erence between termination charges on the two networks.
In order to introduce a demand-side asymmetry between the two networks, we can modify
the symmetric Hotelling formulation in (60) to give a bias in favour of, say, rm A.109
Therefore, suppose that if the two rmsutilities are uA and uB, the subscriber located at
y obtains utility uA   ty + t if she joins network A, and utility uB   t(1   y) if she joins
network B. If  > 0 then, with equal utilities o¤ered, rm A will obtain the higher market
share. With the two utilities ui = u  Pi, the market shares ni are then given by
nA =
1 + 
2
+
PB   PA
2w
; nB =
1  
2
+
PA   PB
2w
: (84)
After substituting these market shares into (83), given an initial choice of termination
charges faA; aBg some tedious calculations show that the equilibrium prices for the two rms
are
PA =
2CA + CB + w
3
+ w +
a
3

   
C
w

(85)
PB =
CA + 2CB   w
3
+ w +
a
3

   
C
w

:
Here, we have written C = CA   CB for the cost di¤erence and a = aA   aB for the
di¤erence in termination charges.
Notice that the termination charge di¤erential, a, a¤ects the two rms equilibrium
prices in the same way. This implies that the equilibrium price di¤erence, PA   PB, is
PA   PB = 1
3

C + 2w
	
: (86)
Crucially, this price di¤erence, which is what determines the equilibrium market shares, does
not depend on the termination charges. The equilibrium market shares of the two rms are
nA =
1
2
+
1
6

   
C
w

; nB =
1
2
  1
6

   
C
w

: (87)
109This is the specication for network choice used in Carter and Wright (1999) and Carter and Wright
(2003). The following analysis does not depend at all on this particular Hotelling specication, and will apply
to any case where there is full participation. We use this functional form merely to derive a closed-form
equilibrium.
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Without loss of generality, suppose we label the rms so that
w > C : (88)
This implies that As advantage on the demand side all else equal, subscribers are willing
to pay w more for As service than for Bs outweighs any cost disadvantage C . From
(87) this implies that A has the larger market share in equilibrium. In addition, for the
preceding analysis to be valid we require that the larger rm does not corner the market,
i.e., that nA < 1 at the equilibrium. Clearly, this requires that the asymmetries are not too
great, in the sense that parameters satisfy
w  C < 3 : (89)
When (88) holds, (85) implies that both retail prices increase as rm A is paid relatively
more than B for call termination. In this sense, non-reciprocal access charges, with the larger
rm being paid a higher access charge, act as an instrument of collusion, in a similar way
to the linear pricing model in section 4.2.3. The reason why having large a acts to relax
competition for subscribers is quite intuitive. From (83), when a is large rm A would
like to increase the volume of o¤-net tra¢ c. However, o¤-net tra¢ c, which is just nAnB in
this model, is maximized when market shares are equal, and so this gives the larger rm an
incentive to make the market more symmetric, i.e., to compete less hard. On the other hard,
the smaller rm would like to decrease the volume of cross-network tra¢ c as it makes a loss
on this tra¢ c when a is large. This implies that the smaller rm would like to move further
from the symmetric allocation, which again gives it an incentive to compete less hard. This
is why an increase in a induces both rms to raise their prices.
However, and in contrast to the symmetric analysis of section 4.2.3, high retail prices
are not su¢ cient to ensure that both rms prots are high, since we have to take into
account the payments for call termination as well. (With non-reciprocal charges, payments
for network access do not cancel out in equilibrium, even if o¤-net tra¢ c is the same in the
two directions.) Since termination charges do not a¤ect market shares, it is straightforward
to derive the e¤ect on prots for each rm. Since PA increases with a, and also, from
(83), the prots of the larger rm A are directly increasing in a, it follows that this larger
rm would like the di¤erence a to be set as large as possible. However, although the retail
price of the smaller rm B also increases with a, from (83) the direct e¤ect of increase a
is negative. To derive the net e¤ect of increasing a on Bs equilibrium prots, note that its
prots decrease with a whenever PB  nAa decreases with a (where PB is an increasing
function of a). However, this is the case whenever (89) holds, which we have assumed.
Therefore, the smaller rm would like the di¤erence a to be set as low as possible.
In sum, as one might expect, the two rms have divergent preferences over how termi-
nation charges should be set, and regulation of some form is likely to be needed to resolve
disputes. (However, since total industry prots do increase with a, it would be protable
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for the larger rm to compensate by means of a side payment the smaller rm in order to
induce the latter to accept a high a.)
Although total welfare (prots plus subscriber utility) is a¤ected by the market shares
of the two networks, for a given market share the inelastic demand assumption means that
welfare is constant. Therefore, since termination charges cannot be used to alter market
shares in this model, total welfare also is una¤ected by the choice of termination charges.
Thus, in contract to the symmetric situations analyzed in the previous section where a
prot-neutrality result was derived, in this asymmetric model we obtain a welfare-neutrality
result.
However, consumer welfare in isolation is a¤ected by the choice of termination charges,
and both retail prices are an increasing function of a. Therefore, consumer welfare is
increased by choosing a lower value for a. To illustrate this point, suppose that rm As
advantage stems at least in part from the cost side, so that CA < CB. In this case, consumer
welfare is higher with a cost-based termination charge regime so that aA < aB than
with a reciprocal charging regime (aA = aB).
A nal question to ask is: how does the equilibrium outcome compared with the rst
best? Using the arguments used in more general settings in section 4.2.2, the rst best is
achieved when110
PA   CA = PB   CB : (90)
However, (86) implies that
PA   CA = PB   CB + 2
3

w  C	 :
Therefore, since we have assumed that rms are labelled so that the term fg is positive, we
see that competitive outcome involves the larger rm setting too high a price compared to
its rival than is socially optimal. Put another way, competition results in an outcome that
is not asymmetric enoughfrom the point of view of overall welfare.
A model with a regulated incumbent : To provide a second example of asymmetric competition
between networks, consider the following model with a regulated incumbent facing a fringe
of entrants. (Here we have a fringe of entrants, rather than a single rival, in order to abstract
from the issue of the market power of the entrant see footnote 7 above.) As in section 2,
the fringe is modeled as consisting of a large number of small networks, each o¤ering exactly
the same service and having the same cost functions as each other, and where this service is
di¤erentiated from that of the incumbent. In all respects, including the critical assumption
of inelastic demand for calls, the model is as presented above. The incumbent rm A is
assumed to be regulated at the retail level, and is required to o¤er the combined charge PA
to its subscribers. This tari¤ is assumed to be held constant in the following analysis. Its
rivals are a competitive fringe, denoted B. This fringe is unregulated at the retail level, and
110In fact, this is an instance of the second-best pricing rule in (5) above.
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each rm in the fringe o¤ers the combined charge PB: As before, the utility of a subscriber
on the incumbents network is uA = u   PA, and the utility of those who go to the fringe
entrants is uB = u   PB. The market share of the incumbent is nA, while the fringe takes
the remaining nA = 1  nA subscribers.
We look for an access pricing regime that implements the socially optimal outcome, which
we know requires that the fringe price satises the equal property in (90). Suppose that the
termination charges on A and B are aA and aB, respectively. Suppose that all rms within
the fringe are smallin the sense that a negligible fraction of calls that originate on a fringe
network is terminated on the same network. In that case, analogously to (82), the prot per
subscriber for the fringe is
B = PB  

cOB + aA

nA  

cOB + aB

nB   kB| {z }
prot from subscription
+ aB   cTB| {z }
prot from termination
which can be re-written as
B = PB   CB  anA :
Competition within the fringe implies that each rm makes zero prots. This implies that
the equilibrium retail charge o¤ered by the fringe is
PB = CB +
anA :
Again, this has the same feature as in (85) that Bs equilibrium price is an increasing function
of a. However, the reason for this in this case is di¤erent: the more a fringe rm receives
for terminating calls on its network, the lower its retail charge has to be in order to break
even. Therefore, the reason is the same as in the model of the mobile market in section 3.1,
where high termination payments were used to fund retail subsidies in equilibrium.
Since, from (90), we wish to implement the fringe price PB = CB + [PA   CA], we see
that the optimal pair of termination charges satises
aA   aB = PA   CA
nA
:
In particular, a reciprocal termination charge is optimal when PA = CA, i.e., when the
incumbent is optimally regulated. Perhaps counter-intuitively, then, when there are no
regulated distortions at the retail level, it is not the case that a cost-based termination
regime, where ai = cTi , is likely to be optimal.
In other cases, however, non-reciprocal termination charges are used to implement the
optimal second best price PB in (90) given the distorted price charged by the incumbent.
If the incumbent is protable in this market (PA > CA) then it should charge more for call
termination than the fringe, regardless of the underlying relative costs of call termination.
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5 Conclusion: Instruments and Objectives
This chapter has had a number of objectives. In particular, relative to most of the existing
writing on access pricing, I have aimed to do the following:
1. Pay more attention to the issue of network bypass. When bypass is taken into account,
access charges that di¤er from the incumbents cost (for instance, ECPR-style access
pricing) might have the unfortunate e¤ect of inducing ine¢ cient use (or lack of use) of
the incumbents network.
2. Relatedly, make a more forceful case for pricing access at cost, with the important pro-
viso that suitable retail-level instruments are made available to correct for the incum-
bents retail tari¤ distortions. (Output taxes or subsidies levied on entrants, perhaps
in the form of a universal service fund, were suggested for this purpose.)
3. Relate the contentious ECPR policy more clearly to familiar, and well-accepted, prin-
ciples concerning the theory of the second best.
4. Observe that the more tasks that the access charge is required to perform unassisted
and in the chapter these included (a) the need to give entrants good make-or-buy incen-
tives, (b) the need to induce a desirable amount of entry, given the incumbents retail
tari¤ distortions, and (c) the need to control the incumbents retail prices when those
were not directly controlled by regulation the more complicated, and informationally-
demanding, the various access pricing formulas become.
5. Present a unied treatment of the two way access pricing problem, encompassing a
number of recent theoretical contributions. In particular, it was clearly seen that
easypolicy conclusions such as (i) access charges can be used to sustain collusive
outcomes or (ii) access charges have no e¤ect on equilibrium prots were not robust
to small changes in the assumptions.
6. Argue that, even in the most competitivemarkets such as the mobile sector there
is likely to remain a role for regulation of access charges.
The instruments used to try to achieve these objectives have been kept as simple and
streamlined as possible. Most importantly, I have discussed only the theory of access pricing;
di¢ culties involved in implementation have been conveniently ignored. There are numerous
further modelling assumptions that have been made, I believe, merely for presentational
clarity and tractability. These include:
Full information about costs: I assumed throughout that the incumbents costs were known
to all, and also could not be a¤ected by, say, managerial cost-reducing e¤ort. While it is
clear that imperfect regulatory knowledge of costs and the potential for cost reduction has
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an important impact on regulatory policy, the interaction of these features with the access
pricing problem does not often seem to generate many new insights. Thus, it could be
said that, to the extent they depend on the realized costs of the incumbent, access pricing
regimes such as cost-based access, ECPR or Ramsey pricing all exhibit features of cost-
plusregulation. In particular, if an incumbent is required to pass on e¢ ciency savings to
entrants in the form of lower access charges, it may have poor incentives for cost-reduction.
(This is particularly true in the access pricing context, where the incumbent is required to
pass on reductions to its rivals, rather than merely nal consumers as in most monopoly
models of optimal regulation.) While this is obviously true, these problems can be tackled
using familiar (but imperfect) methods, such as basing access charges on estimated e¢ cient
costs, perhaps including computer generated engineering models or benchmarking from
observed costs in other countries. The global price-cap proposal of La¤ont and Tirole is
another response to this issue, in that the permitted set of access charges and retail prices
do not depend in the short run, at least on the rms realized costs.111
Constant marginal costs: Similarly, marginal costs were assumed to be una¤ected by the scale
of output. This makes little di¤erence to the analysis. For instance, with the competitive
fringe model the analysis would go through if the terms C1 and C2 were just interpreted as
the (endogenous) marginal costs evaluated at the equilibrium.112
Other assumptions are far from innocuous, however, and the strong focus on static analy-
sis is perhaps the leading limitation of the analysis. For instance, all costs of the incumbent
were taken to be avoidable if that rm ceased supplying the relevant service. One could take
the convenient view that costs such as C1 and C2 are just taken to represent the forward-
looking, avoidable component of the rms costs, and as such are the relevant costs when
discussing the e¢ ciency of future entry given that important parts of the incumbents net-
work are already sunk. This, however, is not at all satisfactory. Were the initial investments
made with full knowledge of the future access regime? (If so, then all costs are avoidable ex
ante and the analysis of this chapter is relevant.) This is unlikely, though, given the often
long-lived nature of many infrastructure investments in the industry, together with the typ-
ical long-run unpredictabilty of regulatory policy. However, to use ex post avoidable costs
as basis for access pricing policy (to be determined once investments are sunk) is a recipe
for opportunism and deregulatory takingsof the kind emphasized in the writings of Sidak
and Spulber. An important next step for research in this area is, I believe, to provide a
proper analysis of the dynamics of access pricing, focussing on the need to provide long-run,
stable incentives for the incumbent (and other rms) to invest e¢ ciently in infrastructure
and innovation.
111See section 4.7 in La¤ont and Tirole (2000) for further discussion. See also La¤ont and Tirole (1994)
for a full account of optimal access pricing with asymmetric information, and De Fraja (1999) for related
analysis.
112See Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) for analysis along these lines.
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